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SECTION 482 AND THE INTEGRA TED 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 
John W. Lee* 
THE classic integrated business enterprise is the full-line manufac-turing company that distributes its own products through sub-
sidiaries or related wholesalers and retailers.1 This business strUcture is 
functionally2 or vertically integrated, 3 since a single entity controls all 
functions O! stages in an industry from top to bottom. Potentially, such 
a multi-corporate enterprise can split its income among its separately 
incorporated functions. The ability to split income would allow both 
domestic and multinational integrated business enterprises to obtain 
advantageous tax treatment. Domestic enterprises could obtain the 
advantage of multiple surtax exemptions.4 And since domestically 
owned foreign corporations are ordinarily subject to the lower tax 
rates of foreign jurisdictions, rather than the substantially higher United 
States income tax rates, multinational enterprises could obtain a sig-
nificant tax break through the separate incorporation of its foreign and 
domestic components. A multinational enterprise may also secure tax 
advantages through the use of a domestic Western Hemisphere Trade 
Corporation which is taxed at 14 percentage points below the regular 
United States corporate rate.5 
Although the courts, Congress and the Treasury Department have 
established numerous express barriers to exploiting the potential tax 
advantage of operating in a multi-corporate form, each of these bar-
riers, because of its definiteness, may be circumvented by careful tax 
planning. Under section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, however, 
the Commissioner has advanced, and the Tax Court has accepted, a 
flexible restraint on the tax advantages of multiple incorporation that 
• John vV. Lee, A.B., University of North Carolina 1965; LL.B., University of Vir-
ginia 1968; LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown University 1970; member of the Bar of 
Virginia; associated with the fum of Hirschler and Fleischer, Richmond, Virginia. 
1 Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Separations 
under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1194, 1221 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Whitman). 
2 B. Bn>KER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION oF CoRPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 462 (2d ed. 1966) (hereinafter cited as BITTKER & EuSTICE). 
3 Massee, Section 355: Disposal of Unwanted Assets in Connection with a Reorganiza-
tion, 22 TAx L. REv. 439, 460 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Massee). 
4 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 11 (d). 
5 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 922. See generally Note, Western Hemisphere Trade 
Corporations: Reconsidered, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 205 (1967). For a definition of 
a Western Heinisphere Trade Corporation, see notes 30-33 infra, and accompanying 
text. 
[ 1376 ] 
Section 482 1377 
is subject to none of the limitations of the express barriers. This novel 
use of section 482 appears to nullify the traditional defense to a section 
482 reallocation that the transactions in issue were the ·equivalent of 
arm's length negotiations.il In Marc's Big Boy-P1·ospect, lnc.1 the Tax 
Court sustained a reallocation of income under section 482 which 
effectively denied the benefit of multiple surtax exemptions to an inte-
grated multi-corporate business enterprise. In order to effect such a 
denial, the Commissioner abandoned the transactional approach pre-
scribed in the regulations for section 482 allocations/ and attributed 
the entire gross income and deductions (in effect, the entire net income) 
of sixteen subsidiary retail corporations to a single parent-management 
corporation on the grounds that the parent had generated the income 
of the subsidiaries. Although the. allocation of net income under sec-
tion 482 in Marc's Big Boy was intended to deny multiple surtax ex-
emptions to a multi-corporate domestic enterprise, the same approach 
might be used in another context, to deny different tax advantages to 
affiliated multinational corporations.9 
Although broad brush reallocations under section 482 effectively 
eliminate possibilities of tax avoidance, such reallocations and, in particu-
lar, the court's implicit approval of the generation of income doctrine10 
create substantial tax problems in both theory and practice. In resort-
ing to broad brush reallocations the Commissioner by-passes several 
existing Code and regulation sections which provide at least a partial 
6 Section 482 authorizes the Commissioner to allocate gross income, deductions, 
credits, or allo\vances among two or more entities controlled by the same interests in 
order to prevent tax evasion or to reflect clearly the income of any of the entities. 
ll\1. REv. Com:: of 1954, § 482. The purpose of section 482 is to place a controlled tax-
payer on a parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the 
standard of an uncontrolled ta:-.:payer, the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer. 
The standard to be applied in eyery case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at 
arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer. Tre2S. Reg. § 1.482.1 (b) (1968). 
7 52 T.C. 1073 (1969). 
8Treas. Reg.§ 1.482-2 (1968). 
9 Although the generation of income doctrine under section 482 has not yet been the 
vehicle for allocating net income among affiliated multinational corporations, the Com-
missioner has enjoyed no small degree of success in reallocating the entire income of 
inert foreign subsidiaries under this section. See, e.g., Philipp Bros. Chems., Inc. (~. Y.) 
v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970); aff'g, Philipp Bros. Chems., Inc. C\Id.), 52 
T.C. 240 (1969); United States Gypsum Co. v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. 
Til. 1969), rcv'd on other grounds, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f. 9706 0971). 
10 Under the generation of income doctrine a taxpayer that designates an entity to 
perform services and exercises control over that entity is taxable upon income produced 
by such services. Sec notes 172-175 infra, and accompanying text. 
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remedy for tax avoidance resulting from multiple incorporation of an 
integrated business. Where international multi-corporate enterprises are 
concerned, the Commissioner's tack conflicts with the basic policy un-
derlying taxation of multinational corporations-an allocation of the 
profits of the enterprise to effect a fair sharing of the tax revenu·es among 
the various countries touched by its business activities.11 Therefore, 
the position of this Article is that the Commissioner should abandon 
the approach taken in Marc's Big Boy and confine his attack on multi-
corporate abuse to existing provisions, focusing especially on section 
26912 where domestic enterprises are concerned and on the specific 
intercompany transactional regulations under section 482 where multi-
national enterprises are concerned. Should these provisions prove un-
equal to the task, the Service should seek a legislative or administrative 
remedy, rather than attempting to create an expansive judicial doc-
trine of reallocation under section 482. 
THE IMPETus FOR ALLOCATIONs: PoTENTIAL TAX ADvANTAGES 
OF OPERATING INTEGRATED BusiNEss ENTERPRISEs 
IN THE MULTI-CORPORATE FORi\1: 
Before discussing the various methods for reallocating income among 
affiliated corporations, it is necessary to consider the potential tax ad-
vantages that could accrue to such affiliated corporations if there were 
rio vehicle for reallocating income. In this section, the potential tax ad-
vantages of operating an integrated business enterprise in the multi-
corporate form are discussed. Since different advantages accrue to in--
tegrated domestic enterprises than to integrated multinational enter-
prises, the two will be discussed separately. 
Advantages to Affiliated Domestic Corpomtions 
The potential for multiple surtax exemptions arose in 1950 when 
Congress substituted for the graduated federal corporate tax rate a flat 
rate modified by a concession for small businesses.13 This concession 
took the form of a surtax exemption: whereas a normal tax of 22 per-
cent is imposed on a corporation's entire taxable income/4 a surtax of 26 
11 See Surrey, Treasury's Need to Curb Tax Avoidance in Foreign Business Through 
Use of 482, 28 J. TAXATION 75 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Surrey). 
12 For a discussion of section 269, see notes 62-64 infra, and accompanying text. 
13 S. REP. No. 2375, 8Ist Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 
483, 492; S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 (Part 2), 
CuM. BuLL. 505, 652; S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 133 (1969). 
14 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 11 (b) (2). 
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percent is imposed only on its taxable income in excess of $25,000.15 
At the time it enacted tire new law Congress expressed concern that the 
surtax might be abused by an integrated multi-corporate business enter-
prise. Congress, however, felt that the predecessors to sections 269 and 
482 would prevent such enterprises from fragmenting their functions 
into multiple corporations and thus avoiding income tax.16 Signifi-
cantly, Congress focused on the taxpayer's intent regarding tax avoid-
ance, and not on the size of the corporate structure involved. 
The House was not convinced that Congress had dealt properly with 
the problem of multiple surtax ·exemptions, and the very next year it 
proposed to eliminate such exemptions for corporations so closely asso-
ciated that they constituted a single business.17 The Senate rejected 
the House proposal on the grounds that there existed valid business 
purposes for the multi-corporate structure, primarily in the area of 
business expansion.18 Perhaps because section 269 had proven inade-
quate to prevent abuse of the surtax ·exemption, the House and Senate 
compromised their differences by including the predecessor to section 
1551 in the Revenue Act of 195U9 The Joint Committee, however, 
did not intend this provision to prohibit or even discourage the forma-
tion of additional corporations for the. pu.rpose of expanding an exist-
ing integrated business or engaging in different busin·esses; rather, the 
thrust of the provision was at the fragmentation of an existing business.20 
Although Congress, during debate on the Revenue Act of 1964, 
acknowledged that the intent to engage in the same business in different 
geographic locales, or in different businesses in the same locale might 
15/d. at§§ 11 (c)(3) and 11 (d). 
16 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 70-72 (1950), reprinted i1l 1950-2 CuM. BeLL. 
483, 533-34. 
17H. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1951), reprinted i1l 1951-2 CuM. Bt:LL. 
357, 374. 
18S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 67-69 (1951), reprinted in 1951-2 CuM. Bt:LL. 
458, 506-07. . 
19 Section 1551 authorizes the Commissioner to disallow a corporation's surtax ex-
emption if (1) another corporation or five or fewer individuals transfer_ property 
to that corporation, (2) the transferee corporation was established for the purpose of 
acquiring such property or was not actively engaged in business at the time of the 
acquisition, and (3) the transferors control the transferee corporation following the 
transferor, unless the transferee corporation can establish by a clear preponderance 
of the eddence that the securing of the exemption was not a major purpose of the 
transfer. 11'.7. REv. ConE of 1954, § 1551. 
20 Jm~T CoMMITTEE STAFF, 82o CoNG., 1ST SESs., SuM::\I.\RY oF PRoVISIONS oF nm 
REVENUE Acr oF 1951, reprinted in 1951-2 CuM. BuLL. 287, 303-04. 
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be a valid business purpose for multiple incorporation,21 it ignored this 
factor in limiting the availability of multiple surtax exemptions to 
controlled multiple corporations. For such a controlled group of cor-
porations Congress limited the privilege of electing ·multiple surtax 
exemptions by imposing a 6 percent penalty on the first $25,000 of each 
controlled corporation's income.22 Congress hoped this measure would 
discourage multiple incorporation.23 In fact, multi-corporate enter-
prises24 proliferated. Moreover, the business purposes of expansion anci 
geographic dispersion_ proved potent defenses to attacks on multiple 
incorporation under section 269 and 1551.2 ::; Consequently, in 1969, 
Congress, admitting that large businesses had received considerable tax 
benefits through the use of the surtax exemption,26 carried the ap-
proach first taken in 1964 to its logical conclusion by eliminating all 
multiple surtax exemptions for controlled corporations whether or not 
the multi-corporate structure had heen chosen for valid business rea-
sons.27 After a transitional period during which the benefits to be 
derived from such exemptions will decrease steadily28 members of a 
controlled group of corporations will be entitled to only one $25,000 
21 S. REP. Ko. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 149-50 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 CuM. Buu.. 
505, 653-54. 
22 INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 1562, repealed effective for taxable years beginning after 
December 31, 1974, by Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 401 (a) (2). See lNTERXAL REVENUE ConE 
of 1954, § 1563 (a) (definition of a controlled group of corporations). · 
23 S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 Cu;-.r. BULL. 
505,654. 
24 See Joun· PusuCATIO.'O Co:.\IMITIEE oN \-VAYS AND MEANS A!'.'D CoMMITTEE oN 
FtNAXCE, 9lsr CoNG., lsr SEss., TAx REFORi\1 SroD!ES AXD PROPOSALS (Part 2) 242 (Comm. 
Print 1969) (hereinafter cited as Johnson Tax Reform Proposals); Tax Reform Pro-
posals contained in the Message From the President of April 21, 1969, and presented by 
Representatives of "the Treasury Department, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (Comm. Print 
1969) (hereinafter cited as Ni"l:on Tax Reform Proposals). 
!!::>Sec note 66 infra. 
26 S. REP. Ko. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 133-34 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 CuM. 
BULL. 423, 508-09. 
27 I d. at 134, reprinted in 1969-3 CuM. BuLL. at 509. 
28 The act provides a five-year period during which each extra surtax exemption will 
be reduced by S4,167 per year. I:!'oo'T. REV. ConE of 1954, § 1564 (a) (1) (A). It should be 
noted that the 6% penalty tax on election of multiple surtax exemptions w:U apply only 
to the reduced exemptions. Thus the maximum tax value of such surta."l: exemptions 
during this period will be approximately $4,006 for 1970; $3,333 for 1971; S2,500 for 
1972; $1,666 for 1973; and $833 for 1974. Eustice, Corporations and Corporate Investors, 
25 TAx L. REv. 509, 561 (1970). After December 31, 1974, of course, the 6% penalty 
provision of section 1562 (b) will be inoperative. See note 22 supra. 
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surtax exemption.29 But procedural delay in audit, litigation and ap-
pellate review, and the resourcefulness of taxpayers in avoiding classifi-
cation as a controlled group of corporations will make the issue of 
multiple surtax exemptions a live issue in the tax law throughout most 
of this decade. 
Advantages to Affiliated Multinational Corporations 
The income attributed to a Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation 
(WHTC) is taxed at 14 percentage points below the normal corporate 
rate. The WHTC provisions,30 however, contain their own limitations 
on tire allocation of income. In order to qualify as a WHTC for a taxable 
year, a domestic corporation must carry on all of its business, other 
than incidental purchases, in the W·estern Hemisphere;31 for the pre-
ceding three years it must have derived 95 percent of its gross income 
from sources without the United States;32 and it must derive at least 
90 percent of its gross income from the active conduct of a trade or 
business.33 There is, however, no analogue to section 15 51 that pro-
vid·es for disallowance of a WHTC's tax preference in certain trans-
actions where tax avoidance was a major purpose. Furthermore, the 
Service has ruled that creation of a WHTC to obtain the attendent 
preferential tax treatment do·es not constitute such tax avoidance that, 
under section 269, would permit the Commissioner to disallow tax 
benefits.34 Consequently, section 482, if no more than by default, has 
come to be tire only tool the Service has to prevent abuse of this pref-
erence. In the past, however, the Service has been able to eliminate 
the tax benefits of WHTC's, as contrasted wjth diluting them through 
29 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1561 (applicable to taxable years beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1963). 
30 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 921-922. 
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.921-1 (a) (1957) (5% safehaven). See Otis Elevator Co. v. United 
States, 301 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Topps of Canada, Ltd., 36 T.C. 326 (1961). 
32 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 861-864. 
33 Little guidance is provided in the regulations as to what constitutes the active 
conduct of a trade or business for the purposes of section 921. There is some ques-
tion whether the development under identical language in other provisions, such 
as INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 274, 346, 355, 761, 864 (c) (4) (B) (i) 931, 954 (c), 1372 
(e) (5) (B) (i), and 4914 (a) (6), is relevant. See Parshelsl.."Y's Estate v. Commissioner, 
303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally B. BITTKER & L. EBB, UNITED STATES TAXATION 
oF FoREIGN INCOME AND FoREIGN PERSoNs 365 (2d ed. 1968) (hereinafter cited as BriTKER 
&EBB). 
34 Rev. Rul. 70-238, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 61. 
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p~tial 482'-reallocations, 33 only when the -WHTC was totally ·"inert'? .a~ 
or-bore no economic risk at all in the foreign-sale.37 . 
:: The basis for the preferential tax treatment of foreign affiliates is 
that the Upited.States taxes .foreign-corporations only on their income 
from United States sources.38 Until 1962 the United States-taxed do-
mestic shareholders on such foreign source income _ (to the extent the 
United States rate: was above that applicable in the foreign c.ountry) 3~ 
RrJ:y .. wh~n it- was repatriated, commonly ~ dividends '?~ !iquidation 
_distributions.40 The _effect was "tax deferral." 41 In 1962 Co~gress en-
acted Subpart F to limit -the berrefits of tax deferral for multi-corporate 
integrated production-export business enterprises. The United States 
now taxes a domestic shareholder42 on his undistributed pro rata share 
pf the profits43 of a controlled foreign corporation/4 if such corpora-
tion -is organized in one foreign country-the "base country" 45-but 
rp.anufactures; in a second foreign c<:mntry, goods· that . are sold t<? 
a,n _affiliated foreign corporation in a third country.46 Because the pro-
visions were aimed at the ·elimination of artificial stimuhition pf foreign 
i:O.vestment through segregation of the largest portion of the profit in 
_a "tax haven" country rather than . in the countries of origin and 
destination,47 an administrative exception is available if the bas~ coun-
_ss See, e.g., Baldwin-Li~a-H:imilton Corp. v: United States, 435 F.2d 182 ·(7th Cir. 
1970); cf. Johnson Bronze Co., 34 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1689 (1965). · 
36Philipp Bros. ·chems.,_Inc. (N.Y.) v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970). 
, 37 Uni_ted States Gypsum Co. v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 627, 640 _(N.D. Ill. 1969),. 
rev'd on other grozmds, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas.~ 9706 (1971). : . . · ~ 
,; .38lNT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 881-82. 
39 A dom~tic corporation owning at !east 10% of the voting stoc;:k -~of 1 a foreign 
·corporation may elect to be treated as if it paid foreign income taxes iti the same pro-
portion as the dividends received from accumulated profits bear to· the--after-tax -ac-
cumulated-profits of-the foreign subsidiary. IN-r: REv. CoDE of 1954, §§·901'(a), 902_ (a). 
40 A significant exception to this rule occurs when the corporation is a !oreign per-
sonal holding company. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 1551-58 . 
. 41 S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1962), reprinted in 1962~3 CUM._Buu.. 
707,784. 
42 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 951 (a). 
43Jd. at§§ 953_(a) (2), 954. _ . . , . 
·_44Jd. at § 957. Control consists of more tnan 50% ownership o{ the' total 'combined 
votipg power .o.f all classes of voting stock by United States shareholders .. 
: .45Jd. at § 954 (d); see Pine, Foreii,n Base Companies Involved in Selling, N.Y.U. 
iiBT.INST. ON FED. TAX. 881, 882-83 (1963). The base country is tJpicilly·a tax haven 
)t1Ps~iction. See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3-
G,uM. Buxi. 707, 784. . . ·. 
"4GhiT::REv.ToDE ·of 1954, §§ 952(at(3), 954(a)(2), 95'f(d). 
47 See BrTIKER & EuSTICE, supra note 2, at 265; S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 707, 790:-' .. ·· · · · - -·.: · :. · · · · · · 
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try's effective tax rate is 90 p_ercent, or 'within 5 percentage points; of the 
.effective tax rate of the country of destination or of production, which.:. 
ever is lesser.48 • 
· Thus, as long as taxes are paid at an effective rate equal to that of 
country of destination, the United States shareholder can still defer 
domestic taxation, while paying only foreign taxes which may be 
minimal. Consequently, regarding many international integrated busi-
nesses, there will exist a powerful incentive for the Commissioner to 
allocate income to the non-preferentially taxed domestic corporation at 
the expense of the preferentially taxed foreign corporations. Section 
482 again would be the primary means for this allocation.49 Neverthe-
less, an allocation of the entire profit of the foreign corporations to 
the domestic corporation would conflict with the policy underlying 
the application of section 482 to international business transactions, 
which is to allocate income to effect a fair sharing of tax revenues among 
the various countries touched by the activities of the entire business 
·enterprise. 50 
ALLOCATING INcOME AMoNG AFFILIATED CoRPORATIONs To 
PREVENT TAX ABusE:- THE PossiBLE APPRoAcHEs 
Provisions Other Than Section· 482 
As we have seen, section 482 is the only provision available to the 
Cominissioner to allocate income among the corporate components of 
a multinational enterprise. There are, however, alternatives to section 
482 where multi-corporate domestic enterprises are concerned. What 
follows is an analysis of these alternative means of preventing tax avoid-
ance through use of affiliated corporations. 
Section 1561 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 amended section 1561 of the Internal 
Revenue Code to limit tax avoidance through the use of multiple sur-
tax exemptions. Focusing on the extent of common control over the 
; 48 Treas. Reg. § 1.954-1 (b) (3Y (iii) (1964). This "safe haven" is designed to imple-
Plent section 954 (b) ( 4); which 'Provides an exception· f9r a ·controlled foreign corpora-
tion not availed of to reduce taxes. . -
• 49 One of the purposeS of section· 482 is to prevent shifting of income to foreign 
entities 'vhere ii escapes domestic taxation. H. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st SesS. 
H. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 ·cuM.JBirr.t. 168. - · 
so Surrey, supra note 11, at 76. 
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various corporate components of an enterprise, Congress decreed that 
a "controlled group of corporations" would be entided to only one 
surtax exemption. 
The term "controlled group of corporations" encompasses three 
categories of affiliation: [1] a parent-subsidiary controlled group, [2] 
a brother-sister controlled group, and [3] a combined group.51 A par-
ent-subsidiary controlled group consists of one or more chains of cC>r-
porations connected with a comm0n parent corporation which owns 
80 p'ercent or more of the stock of the subsidiaries. Ownership is meas-
ured by voting p0wer or stock value. 52 A brother-sister controlled group 
exists when five or fewer individuals, estates or trusts ("persons"), own 
at least 80 percent of the voting stock or value of shares of each of two 
or more corporations, provided that the same five or fewer persons 
own m0re than 50 percent of the voting stock or value of shares of 
each corporati0n, considering stock owned by a particular person only 
to the extent that it is owned identically in each of the corporations. 53 
A combined group exists when three or m0re corporations are mem-
bers of a parent-subsidiary group or a brother-sister group and one of 
the three is a common parent corporation. 54 
Although the definition of a controlled group is precise, there are 
a number of provisions that make the limitations of section 1561 less 
easy to avoid in the parent-subsidiary context than would seem readily 
apparent. For example, measuring ownership by value, as well as vot-
ing power, may cause related corporations to be classed as a parent-. 
subsidiary controlled group, even though the parent owns less than 
eighty percent of the subsidiary's voting stock, since control has a 
positive effect on the fair market value of each share in controlling 
block of shares.55 Furthermore, if any voting or transfer restrictions 
are imposed either by the law or by agreement on the minority stock, 
then its value is depressed.56 In addition, the voting rights of the re-
stricted stock may in certain circumstances be attributed to the major-
51 INT. REv. CooE of 1954, § 1563 (a). 
52Jd. at§ 1563 (a) (1). 
53Jd. at § 1563 (a) (2). 
54]d. at§ 1563 (a) (3). 
56 See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2 (f) and (2) (e); Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CuM. Buu.. 269, 
270; Rev. Rul. 59-60, § 4.02(g), 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 237, 241-42. But where there is no 
market for sale of the stock and no good will so that a purchaser would be interested 
only in the underlying assets, the value may only be a proportionate share of the under-
lying assets. See Harry Trotz, 36 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 687 (1967) (§ 1239 Case). 
56 Cf. United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967) (Section 1239, SOo/o 
in value test). 
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ity stockholder.57 Finally, Congress also defined the term "stock" for 
the purposes of determining the existence of a controlled group as a 
word of art in order to limit obvious tax avoidance.58 
On the other hand, through careful tax planning, brother-sister 
groups can avoid classification as a controlled group of corporations 
and thereby enable an enterprise to take advantage of multiple surtax 
exemptions. The crucial tax planning aspect in brother-sister groups is 
that the 50-percent test is met only if the same five or fewer persons 
who own 80 percent of the stock of the corporations in question also 
own more than 50 percent of the voting stock or value of the shares 
of each corporation, considering stock owned by a particular person 
only to the extent that it is owned identically in each corporation.59 
For example, if a person owns 90 percent of the voting stock of one 
corporation and 40 percent of another, Ire would be considered as own-
ing only 40 percent of both corporations for the 50 percent test. Th'e 
following examples illustrate the tax planning possibilities: 
Example 1: 
Identical 
Individuals Corporations Ownership 
X y z 
A 25% 25% 30% 25% 
B 30% 25% 25% 25% 
c 25% 30% 25% 25% 
Total 80% 80°1-,o 80% 75% 
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1 (a) (6) (1965). 
58 Stock does not include nonvoting preferred stock, INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1563 (c) 
(1) (A), which Congress felt more closely approximates debt than an equity interest, 
S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 505, 
565. Neither does stock include treasury stock, which from the standpoint of ownership 
constitutes unissued stock. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1563 (c) (1) (B). Certain other 
stock is deemed "excluded" stock and is treated as if it were not outstanding in 
order to prevent neutralization of the controlled group definitions without actual 
relinquishment of the benefits of corporate control. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1563-2(b) (2) (1965). 
Where a parent corporation owns 50% or more of the voting power or value of the 
stock of the subsidiary, stock of the subsidiary is deemed "excluded stock" if owned 
by [1] individuals who are 5% shareholders or officers of the parent corporation; [2] 
employees of the subsidiary, if the stock is subject to substantial restrictions which 
favor the parent or subsidiary corporation; [3] trusts which are a part of a plan of 
deferred compensation for the benefit of the employees of either the parent or sub-
sidiary corporations; or [4] exempt organizations which are controlled directly or 
indirectly by the parent or subsidiary corporations or any combination thereof. INT. 
REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1563(c) (2) (A) (i) to (iv). 
59 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1563 (a) (2) (B). 




Individuals Corporations Ownership 
X y z 
A 10% 50% 20%. 10% 
B 50% 20% 10% 10% 
c 20% 10% SO% 10% 
Total 80% 80'(o 80% 30% 
' . 
In Example 1, X, Y, and Z are members of a controlled group, since 
A, B, and C own eighty percent of each corporation, and the aggre-
gate identity of ownership in each corporation is greater than fifty 
percent. In Example 2, however, X, Y~ and Z are not members of a 
controlled group. Even though A, B, and C own the same percentage 
(26.67 percent) of the aggregate enterprise as in Example 1, the aggre-
gate identity of ownership does not exceed fifty percent. .. 
The purpose of the 50-percent test is to confine the brother-sister con-
trolled group classification "to those cases where the five or fewer 
individuals hold their 80 percent in a way -which allows th'em to op-
erate the corporations as one economic entity." (lo If, as in Example 2, 
taxpayers are able to avoid the 50-percent test and still operate a ~ingle, 
integrated business enterprise furth'er legislative changes may. be in 
order. A simple response would be to eliminate the surtax exemption 
for all corporations. Another solution would provide a more compl~x 
statutory definition for a controlled group that would include all 
functionally integrated enterprises. Meanwhile, where an integrated 
multi-corporate enterprise manages to avoid classification as a brother-
sister controlled group, the Commissioner will be tempted to resort to 
section 482 to prevent abuse of the multiple surtax ·exemption. 
Sections 269 tmd 1551 
. Sectiot?-S 269 and 1551 provide means for the denial of multiple sur-
tax exemptions in years prior to the effective date of section 1561 and 
in situations where the taxpayer has avoided the definition of a COfl:-
tro~ed group. Section 269 grants the Commission the power to disallow 
~ai ben•efits when tax avoidance is·the principal purpose for the acqui-
-sition .of control of a corporation ?r .for th'e tax-free acquisition ·of on~ 
~ { \ft ' ... . • ~ ' 
GO Johnson Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 24,-'att245. 
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corporation's assets by ·a previously unrelated ·cbrporation!31 Never-
theless, the effectiveness of section· 269 as an antedate to abuse of the 
multiple surtax exemption has evolved slowly and even today is of 
limited potency: · · · 
Before the initial surtax exemption legislation, the Tax Court had 
interpreted section 269 to deny tax benefits only to persons who at-
tempted to acquire those benefits by acquiring control of the corpora-
tion which earned them;j)2 thus section 269 was not originally avail-
able to prevent abuse of the surtax exemption by mnlti-corporate ·en-
terprises, since technically it was the acquired corporation which con-
tinued to enjoy the exemption.- But by the late 1950's, courts, includ-
ing the Tax Court, had reassessed -their position on the applicability of 
section 269 and uniformly held that it reaches the acquired corpora-
tion's tax benefits-including the surtax exemption.j)3 
A second limitation on applying section 269 to prohibit multiple sur-
tax exemptions was in assessing the tax avoidance motive of the acqui-
sition. The courts usually gave decisive weight to any reasonable busi-
ness- excuse posited by the taxpayer; thus multi-corporate enterprises 
could generally be justified under the principal purpose test of section 
269.j)4 This problem was partially ameliorated by the Revenue Act of 
1951, which included the predecessor of section 1551, that expressly 
applied to surtax exemptions and under which the tax avoidance purpose 
had only to be a major purpose for multiple incorporation.65 Never-
theless, the courts continued to accept business reasons for multiple 
corporations in •expanding businesses.j)6 The result was that sections 15 51 
· 6r Control here consists of at least 50% ownership of total combined voting power 
of all classes of voting po\ver or of the total value of shares of all classes of stock. 
I:NT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 269(a). 
62 Alprosa \Vatch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948). 
63Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957); accord, 
Joe (Joseph) Dillier, 41 T.C. 762 (1964), aff'd sub ncmz. Made Rite lnv. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 357 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1966). 
-64 See BITIXER & EuSTICE, supra note 2; at'63K D. HERW1TZ, BusiNESS PLANNING i70-72 
(1966) (hereinafter cited as HER'\VITZ). 
65 See notes 19-20 supra, and accompanying text. 
oa See BnTKER & EuSTicE, supra note 2, at 677-78; HERWITZ, supra note 64, at 180-81. 
Apart from traditional business purposes for multiple corporations, an integrated busi-
ness enterprise may avail itself of one of the following business purposes expressly 
sanctioned by Congress: [I] expansion of busi_ness, [2] engaging in the same business 
in different geographic locales, and [3]. conducting different business in the same area. 
The leading case on the- "expansion of business" purpose is Tidewater-Hulls, Inc. v. 
United States, 68-1 U.S. Ta.-..:: Cas: ~ 9405, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.Zd 1444 (E.D. La. 1968). 
See also Delhar, Inc. v. United States, 7f-I. U.S. Tax Cas. ~-9107; 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 
70-5888 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Hardin v. United States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 9676, 26 Am. 
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and 269 became virtually indistinguishable in the area of multiple sur-
tax exemptions.67 In sum, under the existing case law most integrated 
businesses that have expanded a corporation or several corporations at 
a time will be able to withstand the Commissioner's attack under sections 
269 and 1551, despite the fact that the entire integrated business is not 
a small one. 
Section 61 
Under the aegis of section 6168 courts have fashioned the "sham doc-
trine," under which a corporation is recognized for tax purposes only 
if it is a viable business entity. Courts have ruled that to meet this 
criterion a corporation must be formed for a substantial business pur-
pose, or engage in substantive business activicies.69 If a corporation is 
not a viable business entity, it is a sham and its income is taxed to the 
enterprise that actually earned it or otherwise created the right to 
receive it.70 
Although courts once held that the business activity test was satis-
fied if a corporation transacted a single item of business,71 the Tax 
Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5852 (S.D. Miss. 1970); Interior Sec. Corp., 38 T.C. 330, 339 (1962). 
Where expansion is not available as a business purpose for multiple incorporation 
of an integrated enterprise, courts have been reluctant to find that the principal 
purpose was not ta.'l: evasion. See, e.g., Joe (Joseph) Dillier, 51 T.C. 762 (1964), aff'd 
sub ncmz. Made Rite Inv. Co., 357 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1966). For examples of cases 
in which the courts have approved of the multi-corporate form for operating the same 
type of business in different geographic locales, see Louisville Store of Liberty, Ky., Inc. 
v. United States, 376 F.2d 314 (Ct. Cl. 1967), and Southern Canteen Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 410 F.2d 615 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969). Moreover, even in 
a case in which the court found that the taxpayer's principal reason for multiple in-
corporation was tax evasion, it allowed an integrated enterprise, composed of eighteen 
corporations, three surtax exemptions on the grounds that by operating in three separate 
geographic areas it constituted three separate taxable entities. Atlas Storage Co. v. 
United States, 306 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.W.Va. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 437 F.2d 1319 
(4th Cir.1971). 
67 See Eustice, Tax Problems Arising From Transactions Between Affiliated or Con-
trolled Corporations, 23 TAx L. REv. 451, 457 (1968); BtiTKER & EuSTICE, supra note 2~ 
at 679. However, each of these sections does cover situations the other does not: 
Section 269 has a 50% control test as contrasted with the 80% test under section 1551. 
68 INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 61. 
69 See Perry Bass, 50 T.C. 595, 600 (1968), and cases cited therein. 
70HERwrrz, supra note 64, at 181; BtTIKER & EusTICE, supra note 2, at 16, 17. 
71 Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See generally Note, Multiple 
Incorporation to Obtain AdditiOTUil Accumulated Earnings Credits and Surtax Exemp-
tions, 44 MINN. L. REv. 485, 490 n. 24 (1960) (hereinafter cited as Note, Multiple In-
corporation). 
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Court in Aldon H omes72 ruled that the corporation's activity must 
substantially produce the income in question. There, the shareholders 
of a real estate management corporation formed sixteen additional cor-
porations (commonly referred to as alphabet corporations because the 
initial letters of their names formed an acronym) to acquire residential 
lots from the management corporation. The Tax Court disregarded 
the sixteen title holding corporations as shams, and allocated the net 
profits that they had reported to the management corporation. 
In several subsequent decisions involving real estate multiple corpora-
tions, or alphabet corporations, the courts relied on the presence of an 
"integrated business" in applying the sham doctrine. In these cases, 
however, the courts used the term to refer to an enterprise in which 
only one of the related corporations carried on substantial business ac-
tivities, rather than as a reference to a functionally divided business.73 
In other words, the existence of a single integrated business connoted 
a single taxpayer only because the other entities were shams. There-
fore, if in a functionally integrated 'enterprise each corporation carries 
on substantive business activities, the sham doctrine in its classic form 
would not authorize the Commissioner to disregard the component 
corporations and tax their reported income to the management cor-
poration. 
* * * * 
As we have seen in this part, neither sections 1561, 1551, or 269, 
nor the sham doctrine under section 61 provides a dependable means 
for reallocating income among the corporate components of a multi-
corporate business enterprise. Thus, whether the enterprise involved 
is domestic or multi-national, the Commissioner may be forced to resort 
to section 482 if he wishes to reallocate income. 
Allocating Income Under Section 482 
The Prelude to Marc's Big Boy: Allocation of Net Income 
Section 482 authorizes the Commissioner to allocate gross income, 
deductions, credits and allowances among businesses controlled by the 
same interests74 to prevent tax evasion or to reflect income correctly. 
72 Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959). 
73 See Kessmar Constr. Co., 39 T.C. 778 (1963) aff'd on other growzds, 336 F.2d 865 
(9th Cir. 1964); Henry S. Alper, 31 P-H TAX Cr. MEM. 215 (1962). 
74 Control under section 482 differs from the mechanical test of control for the 
purpose of controlled foreign corporations (see note 44 supra), sections 1551 and 1561 
(see notes 52 and 53 supra) and 269 (see note 61 supra). It is "any kind of control, 
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In order to utilize section 482 as a device to eliminate the advantages of 
multiple surtax .exemptions, the Commissioner- must alloc~te effectively 
the enti1·e net income of one corporation to another.75 Since the pur-
pose of section 482 is to keep transactions between c;:ontrolled enterprises 
the equivalent of arm's length dealings between uncontrolled taxpay-
·ers,:6 it presupposes recognition of separate 'entities.77 Indeed, the regula-
tions under section 482 provide that.the section is not intended to "pro-
duce a result equivalent to a computation of consolidated taxable in-
come .... " 78 Yet to invoke section 482 to deny the benefit of a sur-
tax ·exemption through the reallocation of net income, the Commis-
sioner, in effect, must ignore the existence of the corporation that re-
ported the income or consolidate the income of the corporations in 
-question. 79 Because of the theoretical inconsistency involved in net 
income allocations under section 482, the Tax Court, in a long line of 
·cases exemplified by Chelsea Products, Inc.,80 refused to sustain such 
allocations of the net income of a group of corporations to a singl_e 
member. 
direct or indirect, whether legally enforceab~e, and however exercisible or exercised." 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(a) (3) (1968); See generally Seieroe & Gerber, Section 482-Still 
Growing at the Age of SO, 46 TAXEs 893, 897-98 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Seieroe & 
Gerber). 
75 Although 482, unlike sections 269 and 1551, does not authorize the disallowance 
of surta:'C exemptions, a reallocation of all the n~t income from one profitab~e corpora-
tion to another nnder section 482 may accomplish the same monetary result as a dis-
,ulowance of surtax exemptions nnder ·sections 269 or 1551. Challenger, Inc., 33 p:H 
Tax Ct. Mem. 2315 (1964). Note that an allocation of entire gross income and dednc,. 
tions effectively constitutes an allocation of entire net income. 
76 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (b) (1968). See generally pomeroy, AllocatiO'll of lncrmre, 
Deductions, Credits, and Allowances Among Related Taxpayers, 15 CAsE W. REs. 
L. REv. 250, 252 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Pomeroy). It has been held that this iS 
not the sole standard under section 482. See Eli Lilly Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 
999 (Ct. Cl.1967). . 
77 See, e.g., Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006, 1008 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952); Challenger, Iuc., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 2315 (1964)_. 
78Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (3) (1962). This provision resulted from § 482's original 
express authorization for the "consolidation of accounts," but when the consolidated 
returns provisions were deleted in 1928, section 482 was amended accordingly and the 
express power to consolidate the accounts was never brought back into the provision. 
See Mortenson, The Multiple Attack 01l Multiple CorporatiO'lls, 35 TAXES 647, 651 (1957) 
(hereinafter cited as Mortenson). 
79 See Eustice, supra note 67, at 484; Hoefs, -Intercompany Operations: ]oint Use of 
Employees, Services, Plant, Equipment and Intangibles, N.Y.U. 2Srn lNST. oN FED. TAX. 
603, 613-14 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Hoefs). · 
so 16 T.C. 840 (1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); accord, T.VD. Co., 27 T.C. 
~79 (1957). 
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The· first crack in ·the dike. of the Tax Court's prohibition against 
allocation of net income was made in Ballentine Motm· Co.81 There 
two corporations transferred valuable inventories at fair value to a re-
lated corporation having accumulated losses. Then, after the trans-
feree sold sufficient inventory to utilize the losses,82 it transferred the 
remaining inventory back to the transferor corporations. The court 
asserted that the allocation of net income was a proper method to ac-
complish the purposes of section 482:· · 
[N]et income may in certain instances be properly allocated under 
. . . section 482. If net profits are shifted (one device at which the 
statute was specifically directed), it would be a logical short cut to 
allocate them instead of allocating 'gross income, deductions, credits~ 
[etc.].' • • • • The statute .allows allocation of gross income and de-
ductions, and to the extent this is permitted we believe it may be 
done as "net income.'' 83 
The court distinguished cases such as Chelsea principally on the ground 
that they rested on findings that a tax avoidance scheme was not the 
primary motive of the transactions. According to th'e Ballentine court 
the taxpayer would have prevailed had the sales been bona fide. The 
court, however, found that the primary object of the transfer was to 
evade taxes by shifting anticipated profits from the corporation to 
which they should be allocated; thus section 482 was available to allo..: 
cate the net profits to the transferor corporation. Significantly, in 
Ballentine the facilities and employees of the profitable corporations 
were transferred without consideration to the loss corporation. 84 These 
facts coupled with the round-robin exchange of checks through which 
the sale of inventory was accomplished led c;ommentators to the con-
clusion that the loss corporation did no more than procure title to the 
inventory. Therefore, the sale was in actuality a sham.8~ 
The dilce cracked in Ballentine_ was utterly breached in Hamburgers 
8139 T.C. 348, aff'd, 321 F.2d 796 (4th·Cir.1963) . 
• 82 Transfer of income producing inventory to a controlled corporation in order to 
match pre-acquisition losses with income is indicative that the principal purpose for 
acquiring control was evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3 
(h) (1) (1962). 
83 39 T.C. at 358. 
84 !d. at 359. 
85 Plumb & Kapp, Reallocation of Income and Deductions Under Section 482,41 TAXES 
809, 819 (1963-) (hereinafter cited as Plumb & Kapp); see Pomeroy, supra note 76, at 
~~~ . 
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York Road, lnc.86 The shareholders of a highly successful, long estab-
lished men's store (brother corporation) organized a separate sister 
corporation to operate a suburban store. The brother corporation did 
not make a formal transfer of assets to its sister corporation as in 
Ballentine, but the operation of the sister corporation was substantially 
the function of the brother corporation. The same directors and offi-
cers managed both corporations. Although the suburban store had its 
own sales personnel and buyer for men's clothing, the brother's em-
ployees conducted the sister's advertising, purchaS'ed most of the sister's 
general merchandise, supervised the sister's display and sales, main-
tained the sister's telephone S'ervice, and made the sister's bank deposits. 
In addition, the brother corporation factored the sister's accounts re-
ceivable at one and one-half percent, though the commercial rate was 
nin·e percent. Based on all of these factors the Tax Court found no 
business purpose for the sister corporation's existene'e. Furthermore, it 
found that there would have been no substantial difference in opera-
tions had the brother corporation operated the suburban store as a divi-
sion. Therefore, the court concluded that the principal purpose for 
the separate incorporation of the suburban sister was the evasion of 
federal income tax by securing an additional surtax 'exemption. 
Asserting that the existence of common control was insufficient in 
itself to invoke section 482, the court declared that the Commissioner 
must also establish that the brother corporation did not deal with the 
sister at arm's length, "as one uncontrolled corporation would have 
dealt with another uncontrolled corporation." 87 The Tax Court found 
that the taxpayer did not meet the arm's length standard because in a 
sale to an Uili'elated party of the right to use its goodwill, trade name, 
experienced buying and selling organizations, customer lists, and adver-
tising format the taxpayer would have charged the vendee its total 
profits.88 In oth·er words, the court felt that the net income of the sister 
corporation was produced by these intangibles. 89 Therefore, to prevent 
8641 T.C.821 (1964). 
87 !d. at 837; see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (b) (1) (1968). 
88 These items come within the transfer or use of intangible property provisions 
of the section 482 regulations. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-2(d) (1), and 1.482-2(d) (3). Where 
there is no "bona fide cost sharing arrangement," Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (d)(4), the arm's 
length charge is determined in general (where no sufficiently similar transaction in-
volving an unrelated party can be found) on the basis of a hast of factors provided 
in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d) (2)(iii). See generally Jenks, Treasury Regulati011s Uruler 
Section 482, TAX LAWYER 279, 302-06 (1970). 
89For a clear articulation of this approach, see Pacific Northwest Food Club, Inc., 
33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 32, 37 (1964). 
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tax evasion and to reflect fairly the income of the single integrated 
business the court sustained the reallocation of the entire net income 
of the sister corporation. 
Although the Hamburgers York Road court, like the Ballentine 
court, reasoned in terms of tax avoidance, in fact, Hamburgers went far 
beyond Ballentine, since the sister corporation in Hamburgers was not 
a complete sham, but had employees and facilities which arguably pro-
duced at least some of the net income of the integrated enterprise. Thus, 
the point of focus is the allocation of the entire net income where the 
entity reporting the income has its own employees and facilities. Several 
cases decided immediately after Hamburgers York Road did reallocate 
the entire net income of a controlled taxpayer, but in each instance the 
personnel of the corporation to which the income was attributed in 
fact produced the income,ll0 and the corporate shell from which the 
income was allocated was a sham. On the other hand, a triad of Tax 
Court decisions handed down after Hamburgers York Road made only 
a partial allocation of net income where the entity reporting the in-
com'e was not a complete sham, but paid employees who performed 
services producing part of the net income in question.ll1 Consequently, 
Hamburgers York Road potentially represented the high water mark in 
reallocation of net profits, and future development might have fol-
lowed the ebb manifested by partial allocation of net income where the 
controlled taxpayer had its own employees and facilities.ll2 
Marc's Big Boy-Prospect 
In Marc's Big Boy-Prospect, lnc.ll3 the Tax Court looked beyond the 
actual transactions between controlled entities to the nature of the busi-
n'eSS relationship.ll4 The case arose in the following factual context. A 
parent corporation obtained a nationally known restaurant franchise 
covering a multi-state area. The franchise agreement placed extensive 
advisory duties upon the franchisor in exchange for a .fixed percentage 
of gross income. The parent then entered into subfranchise agreements 
90See Charles Town, Inc. v. Commissioner, 372 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1967); J. R. 
Land Co. v. United States, 361 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1966); Spicer Theater, Inc. 44 T.C. 
198 (1964), atf'd, 346 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1965). 
91Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), atf'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966); Nat 
Harrison Assocs., Inc., 42 T.C. 601 (1964); Challenger, Inc., 33 P-H Tax Court Mem. 
32 (1964). 
92 See HERwrrz, supra note 64, at 185-87. 
93 52 T.C.1073 (1969). 
94 52 T.C. at 1102. Contra, Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215, 1228-30 (1945). 
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with eighteen subsidiaries. In addition to requiring that th'e parent 
corporation provide the subsidiaries with advisory services identicaL 
to those rendered by the national franchisor, the subfranchise agree-
ment obligated the parent to perform substanti~ administrative servi~es. 
for the subsidiaries. The terms and conditions of the franchise agreement 
established the policy and operating procedures of the subsidiaries, ex-
cept those regarding financing, locating, and leasing restaurant sites 
-which were to be arranged by one of the dominant shareholders of the 
parent. The subfranchise agreements _provided that the parent would 
recruit and train personnel, maintain a supervisory staff, and perform 
accounting services for the subsidiaries. The court noted that in addi--
tion to this highly integrated formal structure the parent paid the bills-
of the subsidiaries for which it was later reimbursed, and exercised 
comptete control over recruitment. Finally, master insurance policieS-
and a single pension plan covered employees of both the parent and 
the subsidiaries. Thus, th'e business enterprise in Marc's Big Boy was: 
highly integrated both formally and functionally. 
Patently, the parent did not make a fair profit for the spectrum of 
services it rendered to the subsidiaries.95 Although the parent obtained 
revenue from three sources-franchise fe'es, payments for materials fur-
nished, and management fees-the subfranchise agreement limited the 
amounts received by the parent from the first two sources to the 
amounts the parent owed the franchisor under similar provisions of the 
franchise agreement. "Thus, on two items that one might expect an 
independent, arm's length sublicensor to earn profits there could be 
pone .... .?' ·96 Under the third item, management fees, the parent re-
ceived a small profit, but there was no indication how the parties estab-
lished the particular formula contained in the subfranchise agreement. 
, Indeed, the taxpayer did not even attempt to show that the fee struc-
PJre was the equivalent of an arm's-length fee for the services rendered; 
and Ma1·c's ·Big Boy could thus be read to stand for the proposition 
that the Tax Coun will sustain the Commissioner's reallocation of the 
• :.95 Arguably,_ the parent was not required to make a profit from such transaction. It 
c;ould have elected, under Rev. Proc. 68-22, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 819, to have the originat 
proposed regulations apply, rather than those actually adopted. Treas. Reg.§ 1.482-2(b). 
Under the proposed regulations, the arm's length charge for services would be the man-
agement co!'poration's cost (without a profit markup). Just as the arm's length charge 
for a sublease is the lessee-sublessor's expenses attributable to the property (rent) without 
a profit markup, Treas. Reg. § 1.482(2) (c) (ii), it is arguable that the arm's length 
charge for a subfranchise should be the subfranchisor's cost without 'a markup. 
96 52 T.C. atJ101. 
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entire net profit, or entire gross income and deductions, when the· tax{' 
payer does not present sufficient evidence of the arm's length nature .pf 
the transactions to support at least a partial reallocation. Such a conl 
dusion finds strong support in the court's ultimate findings of fact: 97 
WBB [the parent] failed to prove that the dealings between it arid 
its subsidiaries were equivalent. to arm's length dealings· between it 
and uncontrolled taxpayers .. WBB failed to show that the Commis1 
sioner was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in attributing to 
WBB the gross income and deductions of its subsidiaries.98 
The ultimate findings of fact, however, closed with the conclusion 
that the allocations of gross income and deductions to the parent were 
necessary to reflect its income accurately. Amplifying this finding in 
its opinion, the court asserted that had the parent and its subsidiar:ies 
-dealt at arm's length, the parent would have required all the subsidi-
aries profits to compensate for the services it rendered. Thus, Marc's 
Big Boy d~d not turn on burden of proof; at best, the taxpayer's failure 
to show that the parent received adequate comp·ensation from the sub:-
sidiaries was an alternative holding.99 
The Tax Coun in Marc's Big Boy made several significant depart-
ures from its. ·earlier course. First, in principle, but not totally in prac-;-
tic'e, the court abandoned the business purpose justification for multipJe 
incorpc:>ration. Second, it acknowledged that other decisions had made 
partial allocations of net income, but declined to do so in the case be-
fore it. Third, although recognizing that other cases had analyzed spe-
-cific transactions, the Big Boy court focused on the nature of the busi-
ness relationship between the parent and subsidiaries. Fourth and moSt: 
significantly, Marc's Big Boy is the :first case to invoke the generation 
of income doctrine in the context of a functionally integrated busine5~ 
enterprise, thereby making the existence of an integrated business a 
determinative factor in a section 482 allocation. 
Business Pu1·pose-Marc's Big Boy reversed the position- taken in 
H ambzt1·gers Y o1·k Road by expressly refusing to give weight to the 
97 An ultimate finding of fact is not strictly a finding of fact. It is a conclusion of 
law or at least a mixed question of law and fact. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 
u.s. 481, (1937). : 
98 52 T.C. at 1091. 
99 However, the Commissioner's principal argument on appeal is that the taxpayer 
failed to prove that an allocation other than that made by the Service was appropriate. 
Brief for Commissioner, pp. 29-30 (7th Cir. 1971). · 
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presence of a business purpose for transactions between controlled mul-
tiple corporations. Although the motivation behind a transaction might 
be useful in determining whether it resulted in an evasion of taxes, 100 
the court asserted that "neither tax motivations nor lack of business 
purpose is necessary to a .finding of distortion if the transaction has the 
effect of distorting income in situations contemplated by section 482." 101 
The court's refusal to consider a business purpose was correct because 
the application of section 482 to achieve a clear reflection of income 
presupposes the recognition of the various entities;102 the issue in section 
482 allocations is whether the transactions between the entities meet the 
arm's length standard.103 
The court's reasoning elsewhere in the opinion, however, was not 
entirely consistent with this disavowal of reliance on the business pur-
pose doctrine. In establishing that the business was highly integrated, 
the court emphasized that there would have been no substantial dif-
ference in busin'ess operations had the subsidiaries not been separately 
incorporated.104 Although a business purpose analysis would consider 
whether the parent corporation could have done everything the sub-
sidiari:es did, the propriety of a section 482 allocation to prevent dis-
tortion of incom'e turns on what the subsidiaries did do, rather than 
what the parent might have done.105 Consequently, just as the court 
did not consider the business purpose doctrine in its pristin'e form, the 
court should not have considered the fact that no substantial difference 
in operations in Marc's Big Boy would have resulted had tire subsidi-
aries not been separately incorporated. 
100 See Hewitt, Section 482-Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Related 
Taxpayers, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 463, 490 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Hewitt) 
(where the section 482 allocation is made on the ground of tax evasion, proof of a 
valid business purpose is a defense). Indeed, commentators have suggested as a policy 
matter that section 482 should apply primarily to tax motivated intercompany transac-
tions or at least apply less vigorously to situations where valid business reasons can be 
demonstrated for related party transactions. See Eustice, supra note 67, at 517; Jenks, 
supra note 88, at 313; Plumb & Kapp, supra note 85, at 819-20. 
101 52 T.C. at 1105. 
102 Application of section 482 is not limited to a fraudulent or sham transaction. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (c) (1968). 
103 See HERWITZ, supra note 64, at 185.But see Pomeroy, supra note 76, at 257 (busi-
ness purpose is a major factual element in the determination of an arm's length rela-
tionship). 
104 52 T.C. at 1099. 
105See W. Braun Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1968); Seminole 
Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215, 1235 (1945); Johnson Bronze Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1689, 
1705 (1965); HERWITZ, supra note 64, at 185. 
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Rejection of Partial Allocations-The Tax Court had previously made 
partial allocations of net income where there was little evidence in the 
record upon which to support such allocations, 106 explicitly. utilizing the 
famous Cohan rule of approximation in several cases.107 Nevertheless, 
the court in Marc's Big Boy refused to make a partial allocation.108 The 
court asserted that the partial allocation was improper because the 
parties failed to produce a rational basis for approximating a partial 
allocation. The court did not, however, base its total allocation on the 
failure to establish a factual basis for a partial allocation; rather it 
held that the parent would have required all th'e profits of the subsidi-
aries had the parent, in an arm's length transaction, provided them the 
management services and franchise rights. Thus, as in the case of 
court's discussion of burden of proof, its statement that there was no 
rational basis for making a partial allocation was either dictum or an 
alternative holding. 
The court's conclusion that the parent would have charged the 
subsidiaries their entire profits in an arm's length transaction is subject 
to question on two grounds. First, absent extenuating circumstanc·es 
such as a desire to prevent a loss, 109 an uncontrolled party enters into a 
transaction to recognize an existing profit or with the e}.."Pectation of 
making a future profit. Thus, one uncontrolled corporation would 
never surrender its entire profit to another uncontrolled corporation in 
return for intangibles and management services, however extensive.110 
106See, e.g., Nat Harrison Assocs. Inc. 42 T.C. 601, 622 (1964); Challenger, Inc., 
33 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 2315, 2328 (1964). 
107 In Cohan v. C011mtissicmer, 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930), Judge Learned 
Hand held that where the trial court is convinced that a taxpayer has incurred some 
of the claimed business expenses, but the taxpayer is unable to substantiate the exact 
amount of the expenditures, the court should make as close an approximation as it can, 
bearing heavily upon the taxpayer who is responsible for the inexactitude. 
10s 52 T.C. at 1105-06. 
109 Transactions entered into to effectuate social policies or loss-leader transactions 
could also satisfy the arm's length standard although no immediate profit motive may 
be present. But see Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United States, 435 F.2d 182, 
186 (7th Cir. 1970) (absence of profit not a consideration in applying the arm's length 
test). 
110 See W. Braun Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1968); Johnson 
Bronze Co., 34 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 1689, 1706 (1965); HERWITZ, supra note 64, at 183. 
The reluctance of the Tax Court to sustain a section 482 reallocation that would create 
a loss in the taxpayer reporting the income may be an extension of this principle. See 
Huber Homes, Inc., 55 T.C. 598,604-05 (1971); PPG Indus., Inc., 55 T.C. 928,998 (1970); 
Lufkin Foundry & Mach. Co., 30 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 400 (1971). See generally Seghers, 
The recent PPG case: Is it a Blueprint to Balance the IRS's 482 Allocation Powers?, 
34 J. TAXATION 370, 371 (1971). 
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$econd, a_ number of decisions ·have held that a subsidiary or sister cor-
poration that owns assets used in its business and pays 'employees who 
perform services for that business, 111 produces some portion of the net 
income which it reported.112 Indeed, the Tax CoUrt has followed 
this approach even where the management services of the related party 
were the most important factor in the earning process. 113 
The Tax Conn's traditional refusal to disregard corporations actively 
conducting business highlights the interrelationship and tension between 
allocation of •entire net income under section 482 and the sham doc-
trine. Under the sham doctrine an entity neither engaged in substan-
tive business activity nor created for a substantial business purpose is 
disregarded, and the income reported by tire sham is taxed to the entity 
that actually earned it.114 Under section 482 as applied in Marc's 
Big Boy the net income of one entity is also attributed to another 
entity, but technically th'e first entity is recognized for tax purposes.115 
Thus, the practical effect of both approaches- is the same.116 
The Second Circuit avoided this untoward result in W. Braun Co. 
v. Commissioner,117 holding that where there is a business purpose to 
the challenged transaction or corporate structure the Commissioner 
cannot allocate the entire net income of one entity to another: "Sec-
tion 482 does not give the Commissioner the power to disregard sep-
· 111 Services appear to be a more significant factor than ownership of capitaL See 
generally Kalish & Bodner, Planning to Avoid Difficulties With 482 Adjustments For 
Related Entities, 33 J. TAXATION 2, 4 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Kalish & Bodner). 
112Philipp Bros. Chems. (Md.), 52 T.C. 240 (1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 53 (2d. Cir. 1970); 
Nat Harrison Assocs., Inc. 42 T.C. 601, 620 (1964); Grenada Indus., Inc., 17 T.C. 231 
:(1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953). · H.R. 10650, 
87th Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1962), would have modified section 482 to permit allocations 
with respect to sales of goods between domestic and foreign controlled taxpayers on 
the basis of assets, compensation of employees, and promotional expenses attributable to 
each taxpayer. See note 145 infra. This approach clearly recognizes the principle 
stated in text. 
113Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114,126 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
385 u.s. 899 (1966). 
114SeePerryR.Bass, 50T.C. 595,600 (1968). 
115See Advance Mach. Exch. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006, 1008 (2d. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952); Challenger, Inc., 33 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 2315, 2327 (1964). 
116::\ significant exception is that the section 482 regulations permit "offset" adjust-
!llents: [1] pre-allocation reimbursement agreements, Treas. Reg.§ 1.482-1(d) (3) (1968), 
amended by TD. 6952 (4/15/68); [2] set-offs, Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1{d) (3); and [3] 
recovery of allocated amounts by a section 482 transferee without double taxation, Rev. 
Proc. 65-17, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 833, amplified by Rev. Proc. 65-31, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 
1024, 1035 and extended by Amendment I, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 1211, further amplified by· 
Rev. Proc. 70-23, 1970 CuM. BULL. 505. 
117 396 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.1968). 
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arate corporate entities if they are being used for a bona fide business 
purpose." 118 Although this approach resolves the tension between net 
allocation under section 482 and the sham doctrine, it conflicts with 
the position that business purpose is irrelevant to allocations mad·e to 
reflect income clearly. 
The Second Circuit resolved this conflict in its recent decision, 
Philipp Brothers Chemicals, Inc. (N.Y.) v. Commissioner,119 stating that 
B1·aun was applicable only where the entity in question carried on sub-
stantial business activities. Although the court merely changed the 
disjunctive in the sham test-the corporation must carry on substantive 
business activities m· must have been formed for a business purpose-
to the conjunctive, the effect was to preclude net allocations under sec-
tion 482 when the subsidiary corporation performs substantial business 
activities. Thus, reading Philipp Brothers Chemicals in light of the 
rule that income must be attributable to the activities of the entity to 
which it is allocated, rather than to the activities of the reporting 
entity, 120 suggests that a one hundred percent reallocation of net profits 
is always arbitrary where the reporting entity is a viable business and 
serves substantial business functions.121 
Under the substantial business activities test the subsidiaries in Marc's 
Big Boy necessarily earned some portion of the enterprise's net income. 
The question then is whether the Tax Court must invoke the Coban 
rule of approximation and make a partial allocation of net income in 
the absence of a rational basis for such estimate. No less an authority 
than the Senate Finance Committee has read Coban v. Commissioner 
as holding "that where the evidence indicated that a taxpayer had in-
curred deductible ·expenses but their exact amount could not be deter-
mined, the court must make 'as close an approximation as it can, rather 
than disallow the deduction entirely'." 122 Although Cohan d·ealt with 
118/d. at 268. 
119 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970). 
120 Pacific Northwest Food Club, Inc., 33 P-H TAx CT. MEJ\1. 32, 36 (1964); see 
Grenada Indus., Inc., 17 T.C. 231 (1951), affd, 202 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
346 u.s. 819 (1953). 
121 See Johnson Bronze Co., 34 P-H TAX CT. MEJ\:r. 1689, 1706 (1965). Indeed, in 
the leading section 482 case involving a professional service corporation (where 
arguably the professional and not the corporation performs all the services), over 50% 
of the net income reported by the corporation was not reallocated. Borge v. Commis-
sioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969). See generally 
Horsley & Dray, Compensating Officer-Stockbolders of Professional Corporations: An 
Analysis, 34 J. TAXATION 146 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Horsley & Dray). 
122 S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 
707,740. 
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entertainment expenses, the rule of approximation has been extended to• 
cover the reasonableness of salaries, the valuation of inventory/23 and 
most significantly partial allocations of net income under section 482.124 
As a result of Cohan, a ptethora of Tax Court cases state that despite 
the absence of an accurate basis for determining the precise amount 
in question the court must make a reasonable estimate, 125 though some 
decisions do limit the applicability of Cohan to those cases where there 
is sufficient evidence as to dates, amounts, and specific items to support 
the computation of a reasonable estimate.126 Some of these cases are 
reconcilabte with Cohan as broad restatements of the principle that the 
taxpayer must first show that he did perform some income-earning 
activity before the allocation of any amount is proper.127 Other courts, 
however, require the production of reliable figures from which to cal-
cUlate a reasonable estimate as a prerequisite to the application of the 
Cohan rule.128 And one Iin·e of decisions construes Cohan to mean that 
a court may, rather than must, make an estimate.129 Nevertheless, con-
ceding for the sake of argument that the evidence in Mtfrc's Big Boy 
provided no reasonable basis for approximation, the Commissioner's 
allocation of the entire net income to the parent was arbitrary, since 
under the substantial business activities test the subsidiaries earned 
some income. In such circumstances, Helvering v. Taylor130 dictates 
that the appellate court remand the case for further hearings to deter-
mine the approximate partial income attributable to the subsidiaries. 
123 See Lillian Pascarelli, 55 T.C. 1082, 1096 (1971), and cases cited therein; Kramer, 
Estimated Income and Expense in the Tax Law, 32 TAXEs 906 (1954); Gluck, How 
Cohan Works: Allowance of Business Expense Deductions When No Exact Records 
Are Kept, 6 RUTGERS L. REv. 375, 383 n. 35 (1952). 
124Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 899 (1966); Challenger, Inc., 33 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 2315, 2328 (1964); Eustice, 
supra note 67, at 495. 
125See, e.g., Estate of W. D. Bartlett, 22 T.C. 1228, 1231 (1954). 
126 See, e.g., Plisco v. United States, 306 F.2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 
371 U.S. 948 (1963); Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932, 937 (1969) (dictum); A. Fink! & 
Sons, 38 T.C. 886,903-05 (1962). 
127 Mayrath v. Commissioner, 357 F.2d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 1966); Oates v. Commis-
sioner, 316 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1963); Robert Neaderland, 52 T.C. 532, 539 (1969), 
aff'd, 424 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970). 
128 See, e.g., Plisco v. United States, 306 F .2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 
371 u.s. 948 (1963). 
129Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957). Williams was a 
refund suit and is, therefore, distinguishable: Unh'ke a Tax Coun proceeding, in a 
refund suit the taxpayer must prove the correct amount of tax payable to prevail_ 
Eustice, supra note 67, at 495 n.115. 
130293 U.S. 507 (1935). See Plumb & Kapp, supra note 85, at 830. 
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Thus, in Marc's Big Boy the trial court should have made an approxi-
mation or reopened the record for further evidence of the arm's length 
charge for the services. 
Abandonment of the Transactional Approach-In Marc's Big Boy 
the Tax Court acknowledged that in other section 482 cases it had 
focused on the arm's length equivalency of specific transactions between 
controlled corporations.131 Moreover, the Tax Court has held that an 
allocation under section 482 is arbitrary when the Commissioner fails to 
attack specific transactions and argues only that the business arrange-
ment was devised to evade taxes.132 Thus, the court in Marc's Big Boy 
confronted precedent that not only approved of the transactional ap-
proach under section 482, but ostensibly required it. Yet the court 
elected to focus on the entire course of dealings between the parent 
and its subsidiaries, rather than on specific transactions.133 
The court presented two arguments to justify abandoning the 
transactional approach. First, the court asserted that neither the Com-
missioner's deficiency notice, nor the conduct of the parties at trial 
placed specific transactions at issue; instead, they focused on whether 
the subsidiaries were separate taxable entities and business enterprises.134 
Second, the court stated that the legislative history accompanying the 
enactment of the surtax exemption and the regulations under section 482 
contemplated the approach adopted by the parties.135 The validity of 
the court's first argument for the abandonment of the transactional ap-
proach is dependent upon the validity of the second argument-that is, 
the failure of the parties to argue the transactional approach does not 
justify th·e court's abandoning that approach unless section 482 permits 
and contemplates an analysis in terms of an enterprise's entire course of 
dealings. 
The court relied upon the Senate report accompanying the original 
enactment of the surtax exemption to establish that the drafters of 
section 482 contemplated allocations based on an analysis of the enter-
prise's business structure. The report stated that the predecessors to 
sections 482 and 269 would prevent the evasion of taxes through frag-
menting "a business enterprise into two or more corporations . . . to 
13152 T.C. at 1093. See, e.g., Ballentine Motor Co., 39 T.C: 348, 356-61 (1962), trff'd, 
321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir.1963). 
132 Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215, 1229-30 (1945). 
133 52 T.C. at 1094. 
134[d. at 1093-94. 
135[d. at 1094. 
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carry on an integrated business enterprise .... " 136 Although at most 
the_ Senate report suggested only that th:e intent to evade taxes would 
trigger the course of dealings approach under section 482, the court 
in Marc's Big Boy invoked this approach to reflect clearly the income 
of th:e parties.137 Thus, the court stripped the taxpayer of a business 
purpose defense that would have been available to him in a proceeding 
triggered by an alleged evasion of taxes.138 That the natural conse-
quences of the court's position is the denial of a business purpose de-
fense points up the inaptness of the course of dealings approach in 
section 482 allocations. A close analysis of the Senate report and sub-
sequent legislative history surrounding the ·enactment of section 15 51 
and the multiple corporation provisions of the Revenue Act of 1964 
reveals that Congress intended to dissuade the fragmentation of existing 
integrated businesses139 without inhibiting the expansion of integrated 
enterprises. Th:e retention of the business purpose defense to a section 
482 allocation is essential to the realization of this congressional policy. 
Since multiple incorporations resulting from fragmentation normally 
lack a business purpose, the related corporations are subject to a section 
482 allocation to prevent tax evasion. On the other hand, multiple cor-
porations created in the expansion of an integrated enterprise, particu-
larly into different geographic locales, normally meet the business pur-
pose test and should, therefore, b'e exempt from an allocation under 
section 482 to prevent tax evasion.140 Thus, the Senate report offers no 
support for a course of dealings justification for a section 482 allocation 
made, not to prevent tax evasion, but to reflect income clearly.141 
Although the regulations under section 482 now provide specific 
rules for allocation in several types of business transactions,142 the Tax 
136 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 CuM. Buu.. 533, 
534. 
· ~31 Clear reflection of income and prevention of tax avoidance are independent 
grounds for application of section 482. Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 
F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952). The Tax Court in Marc's Big Boy 
upheld the allocation on the clear reflection of income basis, 52 T.C. at 1104. The 
Service had argued both bases, 52 T.C. at 1074 n.4, 1091. 
138 See Hewitt, supra note 100, at 490. 
139 See notes 16-21 supra, and accompanying text. 
140 Hewitt, supra note 100, at 490 (1962). See generally note 102 supra . 
. 141 See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). The Tax Court has held that 
this particular committee report does not lead automatically to upholding a section· 
482 reallocation in the context of an integrated business; a review of the facts of each 
case is required. Dorba Homes, Inc., 36 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 753, 767-68 (1967), re'IJ'd 
on other grounds, 403 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1968). 
142 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (1968). 
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Court totally ignored these "intercompany business transaction regula-
tions" and decided Marc's Big Boy under older, general provisions in 
the regulations which the court interpreted to require an analysis of 
tire course of dealings between the corporations.143 The regulations 
that the court relied upon were framed in general terms and do not 
provide a functional definition of the arm's length standard.144 The 
imprecision of these regulations raised problems of administration and 
business planning and were the impetus for a series of legislative and 
administrative reforms, beginning with the Revenue Act of 1962, to 
make standards for allocation under section 482 more definite. 
For example, to increase certainty in the taxation of international 
corporations the House proposed to include in the Revenue Act of 
1962 specific allocation rules for intercompany sales of tangible prop-
erty between controlled domestic and foreigu entities.145 The House 
provision would have amended section 482 to allow the Commissioner to 
base allocations of the profits of such sales on the relative proportions 
of assets, compensation of officers and employees, and sales and pro-
motional expenses attributable to the United States and the foreign 
country. The purpose of the House provision was to permit a direct 
allocation of taxable income which would avoid the complexities of 
allocation under the arm's length standard.146 The House provision, 
in effect, would have authorized an allocation of taxable income based 
upon the entire course pf dealings between the controlled taxpayers. 
The essential difference between the approach proposed by the House 
and that adopted by the court in Marc's Big Boy is that the House pro-
posal included precise standards to define the course of dealing between 
two controlled taA"}Jayers. 
The Senate and the Conference Committee, nevertheless, rejected th'e 
143Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(c) (1962), and 1.482-1(a) (6) (1962). The common de-
nominator in these two provisions is whether the taxpayer in the conduct of his affairs 
dealt as if at ann's length with the other controlled taxpayers. Arguably, conduct of 
affairs refers to the aggregate of specific transactions, arrangements, etc., each of 
which must be measured separately against the arm's length standard. Indeed, the 
House has commented that the usefulness of section 482 is limited when there are 
thousands of different transactions between the controlled taxpayers and once proposed 
a division of taxable income (the Big Boy approach, in effect) to overcome this prob-
lem. H.R. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 28-29 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 
432-33. 
144The predecessors to Treas. Reg.§§ i.482-1(a)-(c) (1962) had been promulgated in 
1934, essentially in their present form. See Jenks, supra note 88, at 280, 281. 
145 H.R. 10650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1962). 
· 146 H.R. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 29-30 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 CuM. BULL. 
432-33. 
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House proposal, asserting that the same objectives could be obtained 
through amendment of the regulations under section 482. Therefore, 
the Congress directed the Treasury Departnrent to 
explore the possibility of developing and promulgating regulations 
under this authority which would provide additional guidelines and 
formulas for the allocation of income and deductions in cases involving 
foreign income.147 
The Treasury Department issued proposed regulations in 1965 and 1966 
and promulgated final regulations in 1968 and 1969 which provided spe-
cific guidelines for allocation under section 482. Significantly, Treas-
ury neither adopted the course of dealings approach suggested by the 
House, nor limited the guidelin'es to transactions with controlled for-
eign entities. Rather, Treasury attempted to delineate the arm's length 
standard by focusing on five broad types of intercompany transactions: 
[1] loans or advances, [2] performance of service, [3] use of tangible 
property, [4] transfer or use of intangible property, and [5] sales of 
tangible property.148 (These regulations are referred to as either the "spe-
cific intercompany transaction" or "amendatory" regulations.) Because 
Treasury limited the scop·e of its guidelines, the Commissioner may, of 
course, resort to the traditional method of allocation-pinpointing items 
of income or deduction and reallocating them to the entity that should 
have reported them-in situations not within the five transactions spe-
cifically covered by the amendatory regulations. One commentator 
has labeled the traditional method the "sham transaction" method, in 
contrast to the more specific approach adopted by the regulations.149 
The narrow question is whether the Commissioner can ignore the 
amendatory regulations in favor of the sham transaction approach or the 
course of dealings approach in situations where the corporations in-
volved have engaged in specifically covered transactions. Marc's Big 
Boy involved two such specifically covered intercompany transactions-
the rendition of management services, and the use of intangible property. 
The legislative debate that precipitated the promulgation of the 
specific intercompany transaction regulations demonStrates the impro-
147 H.R. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962) reprinted in 1962-3 CuM Buu... 1146-47. 
14BTreas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (1968), trmended by TD. 6964, 7-24-68, and T.D. 6998, 
(Jan. 17, 1969). See generally Jenks, supra note 88, at 281; Cohen, Section 482: Treas-
ury's Efforts to Teach an Old Dog Some New Tricks, 43 TA.""mS 835 (1965). 
149 Hamlin, Correct Allocations Under Section 482 Are Still Difficult Despite New 
Regs, 33 J. TAXATION 358, 359 (1970). 
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priety of basing a section 482 allocation on an analysis of the entire 
course of dealings when the specific regulations are applicable. The Sen-
ate's rejection of the House's proposed allocation method in the Revenue 
Act of 1962, indicates that Congress was not prepared to abandon a 
transactional analysis for an analysis of the entire course of dealings 
between the related corporations. Moreover, the Conference Commit-
tee's belief that regulations could accomplish the objectives of the 
House Bill should not be read as an endorsement of the means proposed 
in the Bill. To the contrary, the fact that Treasury adopted a precise 
arm's length transactional method to achieve th'e objectives of the 
House Bill should preclude the use of a course of dealing method in 
situations within the scope of the transactions outlined in the regulations. 
The regulations themselves indicate that resort to the amendatory 
regulations is mandatory when dealing with the situations they cover. 
For example, Treasury Regulation section 1.482-1 (d)(1), which estab-
lishes the basis for the sham transaction approach specifically refers to 
the intercompany business transaction regulations "for specific rules 
relating to methods of allocations in the case of several types of busi-
ness transactions." And the specific intercompany transaction regula-
tions are entitled, "Determination of taxable income in specific situa-
tions." 
Finally, sound policy supports the conclusion that section 482 allo-
cations must be based on the specific transactional regulations wherever 
those regulations are apposite. At the time these regulations were 
promulgated the Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy as-
serted that the guidelines were intended to aid revenu·e agents in re-
solving allocation issues, and to guide taxpayers in minimizing dispute 
on audit so that stability in business planning would not be upset.150 
The regulations relieve the individual revenue agent of the duty to raise 
and solve allocation problems on an ad boc basis in the typical skirmish 
between the Service and taxpayers, and interpose guidelin'es that repre-
sent "careful thinking at top levels of business, the professions, and Gov-
ernment .... " 151 If the Commissioner could by-pass applicable spe-
cific intercompany transaction regulations to allocate the entire net 
income of an integrated business enterprise to th'e management entity 
because the components of the enterprise were not operated as separate 
busin·esses, he would subvert these policy considerations. 
The Commissioner's ability to circumvent the specific intercompany 
160 Surrey, supra note 11, at 76. 
151/d. 
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transaction regulations could also frustrate the fundamental policy con-. 
sideration in the taxation of international enterprises. The goal of an 
allocation of profits among the components Df a multinational enter-
prise is to effect a fair sharing of the tax revenues to be derived from 
those profits among the countries touched by the enterprise.152 Allo-
cating the entire net income of a multinational enterprise to a domestic 
management corporation is hardly consonant with this goal.153 
·Having abandoned the transactional approach, the court in Marc's 
Big Boy embarked upon an analysis of the petitioner's entire course 
of dealings to determine whether the subsidiaries were separate taxable 
1S2 !d. 
153 Despite the myriad reasons for requiring the Commissioner to base section 482 
allocations on the specific regulations whenever possible, the courts have yet to rule 
on the question. In two cases, however, the courts did consider the issue, though neither 
court was presented with a situation analogous to that in Marc's Big Boy. 
In Lufkin Foundry & Machine Co., 40 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 422 (1971), the taxpayer 
had established its pricing method prior to the promulgation of the intercompany 
business transaction regulations. It, nevertheless, argued that its challenged resale pricing 
method corresponded to the resale price method sanctioned by Treasury Regulation 
section 1.482-2(c) (3). The court, however, did not attempt to consider the case within 
the confines of these regulations. Rather, the court looked to the sound basis of the 
pricing arrangement, the reasonableness of the division of pre-tax profits among the 
group, and the fact that the Commissioner's reallocation would have left the Western 
Hemisphere Trade Corporations that reported the income in loss positions. Two 
important factors distinguish Lufkin from Marc's Big Boy. First, regarding the question 
whether the Commissioner must base 482 allocations on the specific regulations wherever 
possible, it is true that the court upheld an allocation not based on those regulations. 
But the taxpayer had developed his pricing scheme before the promulgation of the 
amendatory regulations; therefore, he could not have relied on the regulations to 
provide him a "safe haven" from section 482 allocations. Second, regarding whether a 
course of dealings approach may support a section 482 allocation to reflect income 
properly, it should be noted that in Lufkin the court was not presented with an attempt 
to reallocate net income; rather, the focus in Lufkin. was transactional. 
In a subsequent_ tangible property pricing decision, American Terrazzo Strip Co., 56 
T.C. No. 76 (Aug. 9, 1971), the Tax Court stated that it was reallocating gross income 
pursuant to the standards for sales of tangible property contained in the specific inter-
company transaction regulations, but it proceeded to uphold reallocations despite its 
finding that the sales were made at prices equal to those paid in comparable uncon-
trolled sales. Thus the court apparently ignored the specific method for determining 
arm's length price dictated by the regulations. Tnese allocations, however, were made 
to compensate for intangible factors involved in the intercompany relationship which 
were not commonly present in an uncontrolled relationship. A close examination of· 
these factors reveals that the 482 adjustments were in substance not made to reflect an 
arm's length price for the sales, but to reflect arm's length charges for various types of 
services performed by the buyer-parent which are not covered by the specific regula-
tions. Thus, the American Terrazzo decision does not indicate whether the application of 
the specific regulations is mandatory, since the allocation it upheld involved .a trans-
action not specifically covered. 
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entitles or mere components of a single highly integrated enterprise. 
Although the Service had asserted repeatedly that the presene'e of a 
highly integrated multi-corporate business in itself justified both the 
application of section 482154 and the allocation of net income/55 until 
Hamburgers York Road, Inc./56 the Tax CoUrt had refused to base a 
section 482 allocation of net income on the mere existence of a highly 
integrated business.157 Rather the court's position had been that 
segments of what might have been an integrated business may be 
handled by separate ta.'<-payers; and that the income of such separate 
taxpayers should not be combined for income tax purposes.158 
Some of these pre-Hamburgers York Road decisions involved a func-
tional fragmentation of an integrated enterprise/59 but most involved 
vertical separations, for example, the division of manufacturing and 
foundry operations/60 or the split-up of produe'e and fruit commission 
154See, e.g., Buffalo Meter Co., 10 T.C. 83 (1948); Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215 
(1945). 
155See, e.g., Shaw Const. Co., 35 T.C. 1102 (1961), aff'd, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963); 
Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959). 
15641 T.C. 821 (1964). The immediate reaction to Hamburgers York Road indicated 
that the most significant aspect of the case was the court's placing great emphasis on the 
benefit of the intangible property to the new corporations. See, e.g., Elder, Operating 
Problems of Multiple Corporations, N.Y.U. 24rn lNsr. ON FED. TAX. 1145, 1166 (1966). 
This aspect of the decision was more in line with the section 482 transactional approach 
than the court's conclusion that the controlling corporation and its shareholders treated 
the sister corporation as a component in an integrated business. The significance of this 
second aspect became apparent only in the Hght of recent developments. See, e.g., 
Hoefs, supra note 79, at 613-14. 
157 See cases cited in notes 155 and 156 supra. The Government scored some initial 
success where an integrated business was split vertically, so that two entities conducted 
on a smaller scale in competition with each other the same pre-separation business. 
See Sherman, A Case History of Section 45, 29 TAXES 13, 22-23 (1951) (hereinafter cited 
as Sherman). 
158 Moke Epstein, Inc., 29 T.C. 1005, 1011 (1958) (The issue involved a corporation's 
ability to split-off some activities into a partnership to avoid excess profits tax on 
corporate earnings.); accord, Dorba Homes, Inc.,· 36 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 753 (1967), 
rev'd on other grounds, 403 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Sanford H. Hartman, 43 T.<;;. 
105 (1964). It should be noted that the Tax Court's decision in Moke Epstein presup.. 
poses that the entity reporting the income actually carried out the income producing 
activity, and that any other entities contributing to the-production of income were com-
pensated fairly. See Plumb & Kapp, supra note 85, at 817-18. 
159See, e.g., Estate of Julius 1. Byme, 16 T.C. 1234 (1951); Seminole Flavor Co., 4 
T.C. 1215 (1945). See generally Sherman, supra note 157, at 25-26. · ' 
160 Buffalo Meter Co., 10 T.C. 83 (1948). 
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sales businesses.161 In these vertical separation cases, when the Tax Court 
found that the corporations involved existed independently from one 
another/62 or that the division of the functions among the corporations 
was natural and proper, 163 it refused to sanction an allocation of net 
income. 
The mere fact that the multi-corporate enterprise resulted from a 
functional, rather than a vertical, split-up of a pre-existing integrated 
business should not in itself support an allocation of net income. This 
principle received its most detailed discussion in a non-section 482 
case/64 where the government asserted that a partnership which took 
over the sales and merchandizing functions of an integrated business was 
merely a division of the corporation and not a separate entity for tax 
.purposes. The Tax Court upheld the right of the taxpayer to frag-
mentize businesses previously conducted as an integrated unit into 
separate organizations, each actively conducting a functionally separate 
business. The court found that the partnership was not a sham: it had 
employees and carried on an extensive business of merchandizing, dis-
tributing, and selling. Moreover, the court also found the division to 
be natural and proper, and that there was no intermingling of funds 
or activities.165 
In Marc's Big Boy the Tax Court effectively overruled th'ese earlier 
cases. The court stated that the question was whether the subsidiaries 
were formed and operated as separate businesses.166 The court then ex-
amined the course of dealings between the management-parent corpora-
tion and the subsidiaries, and its opinion marshalled extensive facts to 
show that the parent conducted its affairs and those of the subsidiaries 
as a single, integrated business enterprise. On the basis of these findings 
the court concluded that the Commissioner's reallocation was not arbi-
. trary, unless the taxpayer could show that the parent received proper 
161 Miles Cobley Co., 10 T.C. 754 (1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1949). 
162 Buffalo Meter Co., 10 T.C. 83, 89 (1948) • 
. 163 Moke Epstein, 'Inc., 29 T.C. 1005, 1010 (1958). The court was implicitly con-
. ttasting this type of vertical split-up with one in which an established single line 
,business is divided into competing units, which is a departure from normal business 
behavior and hence unnatural. See Sherman, supra note 157, at 22-23. 
164Sanford H. Hartman, 43 T.C. 105, 116-17 (1964). 
165 By "natural and proper," the court meant that the separation of merchandising 
and selling functions from the other functions made "common sense." See generally 
note 163 .supra. When each formally separate entity confines itself to the activities for 
which it was formed., the <iivision is natural and proper. 
16G 52 T.C. at 1094. 
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compensation.1a7 Although the court stated that the taxpayer's failure 
to show adequate compensation to the parent-management corporation 
was an important factor in its decision, 168 a close reading of the opinion 
reveals that under the court's rationale no compensation less than th~ 
entire profits of the subsidiaries would have be·en adequate. The im-
plicit determination in the court's treatment of adequate compensation 
for the parent-management corporation is that the management 'entity 
·generated the entire income of the subsidiaries.109 Therefore, the sig-
nificance of the presence of an integrated business is that it supports an 
application of the generation of income doctrine. The implicit adoption 
of this doctrine constitutes Marc's Big Boy's most radical departure 
from established precedent. 
Adoption of tbe Generation of Income Doctrine-Perhaps the most 
significant aspect of Marc's Big Boy was its reliance on the generation 
of income doctrine to support a reallocation of income under section 
482. Such a tack is both novel and unwise. 
The gen·eration of income doctrine is a corollary of the more common 
assignment of income doctrine. Both are based on the proposition that 
the 'entity that controls income should suffer the incidence of tax on it; 
they differ, however, in the perspective from which they view the con-
trol element. The assignment of income doctrine focuses on the power 
to control the disposition of income, 170 while the gen·eration of income 
doctrine focuses on the power to control the creation of income. 
Historically, the Commissioner has argued the generation of income 
doctrine in thre·e factual contexts: [ 1] where the taxpayer actually 
earned the income, but never had the power to dispose of it;171 [21 
where the taxpayer had the power to designate the person who would 
-earn the income;172 and [3] where the taxpayer exercises actual con-
167 !d. at 1099. 
168Jd. at 1104. 
169ld. 
170 Under the assignment of income doctrine, income is taxed to the person who 
earns it, Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949), and the tax cannot 
be avoided by an anticipatory assignment, Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); 
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930). 
171 Paul A. Teschner, 38 T.C.1003 (1962). 
172 Robert P. Crowley, 34 T.C. 333 (1960). See generally Eustice, Contract Rights, 
Capital Gains, and Assignment of Income-The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. REv. 1, 43 (1962} 
(hereinafter cited as Eustice, Contract Rights). 
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trol over the entity that earns the income.173 But until Marc's Big Boy, 
the Commissioner had scant success with his arguments.174 
_What little success the Commissioner has had in using the generation 
of ~come doctrine has come largely in cases, brought under section 61, 
involving "loaned employees." In these situations an employer "loans 
out" an employee at a premium while continuing to pay the employee 
his regular salary. Often the Commissioner will want to attribute the 
income to the higher bracket employee, rather than to his corporate em-
ployer. Whether or not he succeeds depends on whom the court deems 
to be the true earner of the personal service income.17ii The Tax Court, 
in Richard Rubin, 176 looked to the facts to find who controlled the 
earning of the income: 
If such control lies with the taxpayer who actually performs the 
services, then he remains taxable on the earnings from his personal 
services, whether or not he chooses to divert the receipt of that com-
pensation to a third party. However, if the direction and control of 
the performer's activities resides in a superior authority, and the con-
sideration paid for the performance of those services is made to the 
person having such ultimate direction and control, then the mere fact 
that the taxpayer has performed the services does not render him tax-
able on the amount paid for these services.177 
But the Supreme Court in National Carbide Corp. v. Commissionet,178 
~xpressly rejected a generation-of-income type approach in a case in-
volving a highly integrated multi-corporate business structure. In that 
.case, the parent corporation furnished working capital, executive man-
:agement, and office facilities to three wholly-owned manufacturing sub-
:sidiaries. For these services, the parent corporation took all the profits 
173 Local Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956 
·(1969). 
174 A significant exception is Local Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 629 (7th 
Cir., cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956 (1969). The Tenth Crrcuit in refusing to follow Local 
Fimmce stated that the section 482 generation of income doctrine contained therein ran 
-contrary-to all other decisions. First Sec. Bank v. Comm'r, 436 F.2d 1192, 1197 (lOth 
Cir.), cert. granted- U.S.- (10/12/71). 
17ii Richard Rubin, 51 T.C. 251, 265-66 (1968), rev'd, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970). 
See generally Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of lnc011Je: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by 
the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 293, 391-93 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Lyon & 
Eustice)._ 
176 n :r.c. 251 (1968). . 
' 177 Id. at 265-66. 
178 336 u.s. 422 (1949). 
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-of the subsidiaries in excess of six percent. In contrast to Marc's Big 
Boy, the parent in National Carbide was arguing (in order to minimize 
the excess profits tax179) that it was taxable on the income earned by 
the subsidiaries. The Court sided with the Commissioner, holding that 
"complete ownership . . .. and control dependent upon such owner-
ship ... [is] no longer of significance in determining taxability." 180 
Thus, the Supreme Court in National Carbide rejected the generation 
of income approach for the attribution of income to a parent in a 
highly integrated multi-corporate business enterprise. Moreover, in ex-
plaining how the parent could extract "the entire earnings of [the sub-
sidiaries], 'except for trifling amounts" 181 if it did not earn the income 
the Court said the earnings "are turned over to [the parent] not be-
cause the latter could command this income if [the subsidiaries] were 
owned by third persons, but because it owns and thus completely domi-
nates the subsidiaries." 182 The question now is whether a doctrine, re-
jected by the Supreme Court in a section 61 case, should be engrafted 
onto section 482. 
There are, in fact, good reasons for keeping the assignment of income 
doctrine and section 482 separate. The doctrine is a blunt tool; section 
482, on the other hand, was intended to fine tuiie the taxation of rel_ated, 
but separate, taxable entities. Indeed, the Second Circuit reversed the 
Tax Court in Richard Rubin precisely because the lower court had em-
ployed the assignment of income doctrine rather than the more flexible 
482 standards.183 Thus, the use of the generation of income doctrine in 
Marc's Big Boy to support a section 482 allocation is most unfortunate. 
Its use forces the court to disregard corporate entities that are not shams, 
and causes intercorporate dealings to be judged, under section 482, by 
the same ali-or-nothing standards normally associated with section 61. 
Moreover, applying the generation of income doctrine in section 482 
cases deprives the law of the predictability that would have attended 
482 cases had the speciflc guidelines prescribed in the regulations pre-
vailed. 
179 Tax Adjustment Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 172 (1945). 
180 336 U.S. at 438. 
181]d. at 438. 
182]d. 
183 429 F.2d at 653. The court in Rubin held that the use of the blunt, "ali-or-nothing'" 
approach of section 61 was not appropriate, since partial allocation under section 482 
was available. Extending this argument, one could allege that allocation of entire net· 
profits under section 482 is impermissible when the more sophisticated specific inter-
.company trausactional regulatious are applicable. 
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The absurdity of applying the generation of income doctrine in 
Marc's Big Boy is apparent from a consideration of the inevitable results 
of the court's holding. Under the court's reasoning, the subsidiaries: 
were required to render substantial sales and marketing services to the-
parent at cost. Thus, unlike loaned employees, the subsidiaries would 
receive no compensation for the services they performed. On the other 
hand, had the court continued to apply the transactional analysis pre-
scribed in the regulations, it would have sought the arm's length charge 
for the sales services rendered by the subsidiaries to the parents who· 
"earned" the income. Under the regulations, that arm's length charge 
cannot equal the subsidiaries' cost where the subsidiaries rendered sub-
stantial services to the parent.184 Even if the court abandons the sP'ecific 
transactional approach and focuses on the entire course of dealings be-
tween the parties, it should look to the substance of the functions P'er-
formed at each level of ·the integrated enterprise/85 ascertain the arm's 
length charge for the total spectrum of services rendered, and allocate 
to the management and sales corporations only the value of the services 
each actually performs. By applying the generation of income doctrine 
in Marc's Big Boy instead of se'eking to ascertain the arm's length charge 
for the services actually rendered by the parent and the subsidiaries, 
the Tax Court made a serious error. 
Marc's Big Boy: A Recapitulation-In applying the sham doctrine, 
courts have frequently engaged in a course of dealings analysis. But the 
alphabet corporation cases were the first to infer the existence of a sham 
from the existence of a highly integrated multi-corporate enterprise. In 
the alphabet cases, however, the subsidiaries were true shells providing 
.no substantive services to the total enterprise. Hamburgers York Road 
was the first case in which the Tax Court based a section 482 alloca-
tion on the existence of a highly integrated business enterprise; how-
ever, many commentators at the time Hamburgers York Road was de-
cided felt that it was, in reality, a sham case.186 Finally, in Marc's Big 
184Treas, Reg.,§§ 1.482-2(b) (3) & (7) (1968) . 
. 185 In determining the substance of the activities of the various corporate components 
of an integrated enterprise, a court should look to the following factors: the proportion 
of assets held by the components, the number of persons employed by the components 
and their relative compensation, other items of e11:pense attributable to each component. 
These factors were proposed in the 1962 amendment to section 482 which would have 
prescribed the method for allocating income between related foreign and domestic 
corporations. See note 145 supra. 
186See, e.g., Hoefs, supra note 79, at 164 n. 45. Had the court expressly rested on 
the sham doctrine, rather than on the section 482, the case would have caused less 
concern among the members of the taX bar. See Eustice, supra note 67, at 484. Subse-
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Boy, the court relied on the existence of a highly integrated multi-cor-
porate enterprise to support a net income allocation under 482 in cir-
cumstances where the Commissioner clearly could not have succeeded in 
a section 61 sham attack. 
In order to support its unprecedented holding, the court in Marc's 
Big Boy drew eclectically from section 61 and section 482 theory. The 
court sounded in sham by focusing on whether the subsidiaries were 
formed and operated as separate taxable entities and business enterprises. 
But since section 482 assumes the reality of the subsidiaries as viable busi-
ness entities, the taxpayer was precluded from prevailing on the usual 
sham defense that each subsidiary engaged in substantive business ac-
tivity. On tlre other hand, by concluding that the parent generated the 
entire income of the subsidiaries, the court prevented the parent from 
showing that specific transactions between it and the subsidiaries were 
equivalent to arm's length transactions.187 Thus, close analysis of the 
court's approach reveals that it is an amalgam of th'e sham doctrine under 
section 61, and a course of dealings inquiry under section 482. This 
alloy effectively deprives the taxpayer of the traditional defenses to a 
sham attack based on section 61 and to a reallocation under section 482. 
As an inevitable result of this approach, the Commissioner may now 
allocate the ·entire net income of an integrated business enterprise to 
the management entity pursuant to the generation of income doctrine, 
as applied through section 482. Such a broad brush application of sec-
tion 482 is not grounded in sound tax policy. Ignoring the specifically 
applicable regulations is contrary to the growing tendency to provide 
safe harbors for tax planning, and an expansive course-of-dealings analysis 
under section 482 is inconsistent with the Rubin demand for greater 
flexibility and with the emerging doctrin'e prohibiting the reallocation 
of the entire net income from a reporting entity that actually carried on 
substantial business activities. 
ILLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE GENERATION OF INCOME DOCTRINE 
The Tax Court rested its decision in Marc's Big Boy upon the con-
clusion that the parent generated the entire net income of the enterprise 
quent cases in the Second Circuit held that the sham doctrine could not serve as the 
basis for a section 482 allocation if the subsidiaries involved carry on substantial busi-
ness activity. See text at notes 117-21 infra. Therefore, Hamburgers in retrospect 
could not have been a sham case, since the surburban sister performed substantive selling 
functions. 
187 See Note, Multiple Incorporations, supra note 71, at 496. 
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by exercising comprehensive control over the wholly owned · subsidi-· 
aries. But the use of the generation of income doctrine to support a sec-
tion 482 allocation of net income is not supported by legislative history 
or judicial interpretation. Furthermore, applying the doctrine consist-
ently throughout the tax law would result in unjustifiable absurdities and 
inconsistencies. 
Attribution of Income in the Absence of Common Ownership 
Since the Commissioner can invoke section 482 to allocate incom'e· 
between two or more organizations "owned o1· controlled directly or 
indirectly by the same interests" 188 the statute apparently would not 
require common ownership as a prerequisite to an allocation under sec-
tion 482, but rather would sanction such an allocation wherever there is. 
common control.189 Although the courts initially refused to allow the· 
Commissioner to allocate income among entities not under common 
ownership,190 in Charles Town, Inc. v. Commissionerl91 the Fourth Cir-
cuit sustained the Commissioner's determination that the same persons. 
maintained sufficient control to justify an allocation under section 482,. 
even though they owned just two percent of one of the businesses. 
Thus it appears that the Commissioner can allocate income among 
entities not commonly owned, if he can establish that in reality the-
same interests control the entities.192 
By rely~g on common control rather than common ownership the 
Commissioner could invoke section 482 and the generation of income-
doctrine to create a fantasia of taxation. For ·example, assume that, pur-
suant to a section 355 split-up of a functionally integrated business, un-
related shareholders of the parent-managem'ent corporation exchange· 
their entire interest in the parent for all the stock of a sales subsidiary. 
188 INT. REv. CooE of 1954, § 482 [emphasis added]. 
189 Eustice, supra note 67, at 486-87; Pomeroy, supra note 76, at 256. Control for the-
purposes of section 482 is not determined on the basis of proportion of ownership, but" 
rather is defined as "any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, 
and however exercisable or exercised." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (3) (1968). 
190See, e.g., John L. Denning & Co. v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 288 (lOth Cir. 1950). 
· 191372 F.2d 415 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967); see Hall v. Commissioner, 
294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961) (presumption of control arising from arbitrary shifting of 
income sufficient ground to invoke section 482 in absence of proof of common owner-
ship). See generally Hewitt, Section 482-Reallocation of Income and Deductions Between-
Related Persons-Up to Date, N.Y.U. 22o lNST. oN FED. TAX 381, 382-84 (1964) • 
. 192 Note that under the assignment of income doctrine pursuant to section 61, the-
power to dispose of income rather than the ownership of the source of the income js, 
prerequisite to attribution. See note 170 supra, and accompanying text. · 
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Assume further that this functionally integrated business is a franchise 
sales enterprise in which the management corporation, pursuant to a 
.contract, prescribes and extensively supervises the operations of the 
independent sales corporation. The only difference between this hypo-
thetical and the situation in Marc's Big Boy is the absence of common 
ownership. In both situations the sales corporations are subject to the 
·strict control of the management corporations, and thus to the extent 
that section 482 is applicable to control without ownership, both manage-
ment corporations should b'e subject to the same methods of allocation. 
If the generation of income doctrine invoked in Marc's Big Boy were 
:applied to the hypothetical enterprise, the sales corporation would show 
·no profit for federal tax purposes, and the unrelated management cor-
poration would b'e taxable on profits available only to the sales corpora-
·tion and its shareholders. The irrationality of imposing tax liability in 
-such a manner casts serious doubt on the validity of the basic premise 
that income reported by one entity is actually earned by the entity that 
.completely manages and controls it. 
Consolidated Returns 
An integrated business enterprise may qualify as an "affiliated 
group" 193 of corporations and thus may elect to file a consolidated re-
turn.194 A principal advantage of filing a consolidated return is that 
the losses of one affiliate may offset the profits of the other members of 
the group.195 The regulations also provide that an affiliate corporation 
reporting a net operating loss in a "separate return year" may carry over 
that loss and offset it against the profits of the affiliated group in a "con-
-solidated return year." 196 The "separate return year limitations" provi:-
sions of the regulations197 impose two conditions upon offsetting the pre-
193 An "affiliated group" is a chain of corporations connected through stock owner-
ship with a common parent where [1] at least SO% of the voting power of all classes 
of stock and at least SO % of each class of nonvoting stock of each corporation in the 
group is owned directly by one or more other corporations in the group; and [2] the 
common parent owns directly SO% of the voting power of all classes of stock and SO% 
of each class of nonvoting stock in at least one of the other corporations included in 
the group. INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 1504(a). 
194[d. at § 1501. 
195 See BriTKER & EuSTICE, supra note 2, at 696. . 
196 Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21 (b)(1) (1966). The term "separate return year" means 
a taxable year for which a corporation files a separate return or joins in filing a con-
solidated return with another group. I d. § 1.1502-1 (e). The term "consolidated retuq1 
year" means a taxable year in which an affiliated group files a consolidated return. 
ld. § 1.1502-1(d). . 
197 ld. § 1.'1502-1 (f). 
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consolidation losses of an affiliated corporation against the total post-
·consolidation profits of the group. First, the members of the affiliated 
group must not have elected multiple surtax exemptions under section 
1562 during the separate return year.198 Second, the corporation report-
ing the loss in the separate· return year must have been affiliated with the 
group for every day of that year.199 Should a taxpayer fail to meet either 
of these conditions, the separate return year losses of an affiliated cor-
poration can be carri'ed over and offset only against the post-consolida-
tion return income attributable to the corporation that incurred the 
loss.2oo 
When confronted with an integrated business enterprise that files a 
consolidated return but fails to meet the conditions of the separate re-
turn limitations, the Commissioner, relying on the generation of income 
doctrine, might attempt to allocate the entire net income of the 'enter-
prise to the management entity and thereby prevent the use of any pre-
consolidation losses incurred by the other components of the enter-
prise.201 The taxpayer's natural response to the Commissioner's action 
would be to argue that if the post-consolidated return income were 
attributable to the management corporation, then the pre-consolidated 
return losses _reported by the other components should also be attributa-
ble to the management corporation. In effect, the taxpayer would argue 
that if the Commissioner can invoke the generation of income doctrine 
to allocate income in post-consolidation years to the management cor-
poration, the doctrine must apply with equal force to income generated 
in pre-consolidation years. Under this approach, consolidation income 
would have to be computed as if it were generated solely by the man-
agement corporation. This computation would first entail off-setting the 
losses of the affiliate corporation against the income of the entire enter-
prise. This computation would produce an equitable result only when 
the ta..'C on the income allocated to the management corporation would 
be as great as the aggregate tax paid by the components of the inte-
grated enterprise after utilizing the multiple surtax exemption. The 
allocation would produce harsh results, however, if under such a re-
computation the entire enterprise would have paid less tax than the sum 
198 !d. 
199 !d. § 1.1502-1 (f) (2) (ii). 
200 Id. § 1.1502-21 (c) •. 
2o1 See Dunn, The New Consolidated Return Regulations May Preempt the Field m 
Determining the Allowance of Operating Losses, 23 TAX L. REv. 185, 201 (1968); Farber, 
Intercumpany Accounting Am(77lg Related Companies: Relationship between Secti(77l-f82 
and Consolidated Returns Provisi(77ls, N.Y.U. 26m lNST. oN FEo. TAX. 719, 721-22 (1968). 
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of the taxes incurred by the components, because th'e statute of limita-
tions would probably bar a refund claim202 and, if the enterprise enjoyed 
a net profit, there would he no loss to carry forward. Moreover, to the 
extent that the statute of limitations precludes a refund of tax for the 
separate return years in question,203 the application of the generation 
of income doctrine would open a Pandora's Box by requiring the re-
computation of taxable income in a closed year to determine the exist-
ence and amount of loss that may be offset against the current income 
of the affiliated group.204 
It is possible that an integrated business enterpriS'e could avoid the 
risk of losing th'e tax benefit of a component's net operating losses by 
not filing a consolidated return. Although the Commissioner might 
allocate the net income of the components to the management corpora-
tion under the generation of income doctrine, the term "net income" 
usually implies income after the utilization of all deductions, including 
any net operating loss.205 Similarly a reallocation of gross income and 
deductions would include the net operating loss carried forward as a 
deduction. Nevertheless, the fact that an integrated business enterprise 
might refrain from filing a consolidated return in order to assure that 
the Commissioner could not invoke the generation of income doctrine to 
extinguish the net operating loss carry overs of its components indicates 
that the doctrine could frustrate an elaborate legislative scheme. 
202 INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 6511 (a) (a refund claim must be filed within three years 
from the time the return was filed or within two years of the time the tax was paid, 
whichever period is longer). It is possible that the taxpayer could invoke sections 
1311 to 1315 to remove the bar of the statute of limitations if it can procure a determina-
tion from the Ta.x Court or Treasury (§ 1313 (a)) that prohibiting the non-management 
corporation from using its preconsolidation losses to offset the preconsolidation income 
of the entire enterprise was a disallowance of "a deduction or credit which should 
have been allowed to, but was not allowed to, the taxpayer for another taxable year .... " 
ld. § 1312(4). Nevertheless, in order to avail itself of an adjustment the taxpayer must 
maintain in writing to Treasury or before the Tax Court that it is entitled to the de-
duction prior to the time that the statute of limitations bars the claim for the deduction. 
Id. § 1311(2) (B). The crucial factor then is whether the year in which the loss 
occurred is still open when the enterprise first asserts that it is entitled to a deduction 
for the affiliate's net operating loss. 
203 INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 6501 (a) (the amount of tax must be assessed w1thin 
three years after the return is filed). 
204 See Springfield St. RR. v. United States, 312 F.2d 752 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (courts 
have power to examine tax matters in closed years to determine tax liability for an 
open year). 
205See Delhar, Inc. v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas.~ 9107, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 
5888 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (investment credit reallocated). But see Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952) (credit for 
excess profits tax not reallocated). See generally Pomeroy, supra note 76, at 260. 
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Divisive Reorganizations 
The court's conclusion in Marc's Big Boy that the subsidiaries did 
not earn any income conflicts with recent interpretations of the "active 
business" requirement under section 3 55. Section 3 55 provides for the 
non-recognition of gain or loss resulting from the separation of one or 
more businesses formerly operated by a single corporation.206 As 
prerequisites for non-recognition the section requires [1] that immedi-
ately after the distribution of stock in the controlled corporation both 
the distributing corporation and the controlled corporation be engaged 
in the active conduct of a trade or business;207 and [2] that such busi-
nesses must have b'een actively conducted during the five-year period 
ending on the date of distribution.208 Although the regulations defining 
the "active business" requirement seem to preclude a section 355 division 
of a functionally integrated corporation, judicial interpretation of the 
purpose of the requirement has led commentators to conclude that 
components of a functionally integrated corporation can each actively 
conduct a separate trade or business. 
The Tax Court's conclusion in Marc's Big Boy that th'e restaurant 
subsidiaries did not earn any income is not inconsistent with the interpre-
tation of the active business requirement that Treasury promulgated in 
1955.209 Under those regulations th:e determinative integrant of the 
active business requirement was the definition of a trade or business. 
The regulations define a trade or business as a group of activities that 
includes "every operation which forms a part of, or a step in, the pro-
cess of earning income or profit from such group." 210 Based upon this 
definition Treasury offered an example asserting that the components 
of a functionally integrated corporation could not actively conduct 
separate trades or busirresses.211 
Three theories support this example. First, Treasury has asserted that 
there can be no division of a single business.212 Second, defining an active 
206 INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 355. Section 355 provides the exclusive vehicle for 
the tax-free fragmentation of a single corporation. See generally Jacobs, The Anatumy 
of a Spin-Off, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1 (hereinafter cited as Jacobs); Morris, Combining 
Divisive and Amalgamation Reorganizations: Section 355 Fails Again, 46 TEXAS L. 
REv. 315, 316 (1968). ; 
207 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 355 (a) (1)(C) and 355 (b)(1)(A). 
208Jd. ad 355(b) (2) (B). 
209 Treas. Reg.§ 1.355-1 (c) (1955). 
210Jd. 
211 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (d) (Example 11) (1955). 
212 I d. § 1.355-1 (a) (1955) (section 355 does not apply to the division of a single 
business). But see Edmund P. Coady, 35 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'd per curitrm, 289 F.2d 
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busin'ess to include every step in the process of earning income precludes 
a single step in the process from actively conducting business.213 Third, 
an entity actively conducting business must produce income indepen-
dently.214 Nevertheless, th'ese theories can justify the example only if the 
regulations upon which the example is based are a reasonable imple-
mentation of the active business requirement contained in section 355.215 
The Tax Court recently held that the purpose of the active business 
requirement 
is to prevent the tax-free segregation of passive investment type as-
sets into an inactive corporate entity; thus enabling future sale at 
capital gains rates of the inactive portion of the distributing corpora-
tion's business. The inactive assets may well represent the accumu-
lated earnings and profits of the continuing business activities.216 
Therefore, the active business requirement should not bar a section 3 55 
division of a functionally integrated corporation unless th'e theories sup-
porting such a prohibition establish that the prohibition is necessary to 
prevent the segregation of passive assets. 
The first theory, that there can be no division of a single busin·ess, 
was rejected in Edmond P. Coady.211 There the Tax Court asserted 
that the function of the active business requirem'ent is to prevent the 
tax-free separation of active and inactive assets into active and inactive 
corporations. In so reading the statute the court could find no "language 
denying the benefits of section 3 55 to the division of a single trade or 
business." 218 
Although the theory that an active business must include every step 
in the process of earning income might justify the prohibition against 
490 (6th Cir. 1961), non-acquiesced in Rev. Rul. 61-198, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 61, 1W1l-
acquiescence revoked, Rev. Rul. 64-147, 1964-1 (part I) CuM. BULL. at 36 (allowing a 
vertical division of a single taxpayer under section 355). 
213 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (c); see id. § 1.355-1 (c)(3): 
A group of activities which, while part of a business operated for a profit, are 
not in themselves independently producing income even though such activities 
would produce income with the addition of other activities or with large in-
creases in activities previously incidental or insubstantial. 
214See id. § 1.355-l(d) (Examples 5 and 11). 
215 Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 33 U.S. 496, 50! (1948) (regulations that 
are reasonable and consistent interpretations of statutory provisions must be sustained). 
216£. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 696 (1971). Note that distributions of earnings and 
profits are normally dividends taxable to the shareholders as ordinary income. See 
:U..'T. REv. ConE of 1954, §§ 316, 30l(c). 
217 33 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'd per curi1Tl1Z, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961). 
21s 33 T.C. at 778. 
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splitting off incidental activities,219 it does not necessarily reflect the 
segregation of passive assets test. Moreover, one commentator has read 
Coady as authority for the proposition that a functionally integrated cor-
poration may be composed of several steps each actively conducting 
business.220 Therefore, the validity of this second theory as a general 
principal is subject to considerable doubt.221 
The third theory supporting the regulations is also unpersuasive. Al-
though 'each component of an integrated business may not be econom-
ically independent, each compon·ent does earn income in the economic 
sense222 and contributes to the success of the venture as a whole.223 The 
assets of a compon'ent derive their value from substantive income earn-
ing activity and are not the type of assets that represent the accumu-
lated earnings and profits of the continuing co!Poration.224 Therefore, 
the assets of a component of a functionally integrated business are not 
"passive assets", the sale of which pursuant to a corporate division would 
allow a shareholder to convert ordinary incom·e into capital gain. Thus 
the third theory offers no support for a prohibition on section 3 55 
divisions of functionally integrated businesses. If the three theories upon 
which the regulations are based are improper, •each layer of a func-
tionally integrated business may qualify as an active business. Although 
the courts have not yet spoken clearly,225 commentators have concluded 
uniformly that section 3 55 does apply to the division of a vertically 
integrated business.226 
219 Whionan, supm note 1, at 1221-22. One commentator has concluded that in the 
light of case law the requirement of inclusion of every step in the production of 
income should be limited to manufacturing a product and should not include its market-
ing or obtaining raw materials for the manufacturing process; however, in a retail 
business, business selling activities should be inseparable from purchasing and display 
activities, which are necessary parts of the "group." Massee, supra note 3, at 466. 
220 :VVhionan, supra note 1, at 1223. 
221/d.; Massee, supra note 3, at 462-63. 
222 Jacobs, supra note 206, at 26. 
223 Whionan, supra note 1, at 1223. 
224 Massee, supra note 3, at 463. 
225See, e.g., Marne S. Wilson, 42 T.C. 914, 926 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 353 
F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965) (Tax Court refused to rule on horizontal division issue). See 
generally Whionan, supra note 1, at 1223 n. 149. In Rafferty v. Commissioner, 71-2 U.S. 
Tax Cas. ~ 9101 n.lO (1st Cir. 1971), decided after this Article was substantially com-
pleted, the court rejected the commissioner's contention favoring a broad reading of 
the independent production of income. It found those regulations to be largely a re-
statement of the rejected separate business requirement (see note 212 supra), and stated 
that the "Coady rationale is also applicable to functional divisions of existing businesses." 
226See, e.g., Whionan, supra note 1; Massee, supra note 3; Jacobs, supra note 206. 
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The test that commentators have suggested to determine whether a 
component of a functionally integrated corporation meets the active 
business requirement is whether the component performs a reasonably 
complete service that contributes to the financial success of the venture 
as a whole.227 Under this test the essential concept of an active trade 
or business is that the entity earn income.228 The subsidiaries in Marc's 
Big Boy would me'et the active business requirement under this stand-
ard. The sales subsidiaries performed a complete service, contributing 
to the financial success of the entire enterprise. Nevertheless, in Marc's 
Big Boy the Tax Court concluded under the generation of income 
doctrine that the sales subsidiaries earned no income. Accordingly, the 
Tax Court's decision produces conceptual asymmetry: although the 
restaurant subsidiaries actively conducted business, they earned no in-
come. 
Corporate Mergers 
The Tax Court's holding in Marc's Big Boy that th'e management 
entity of an integrated enterprise earns the entire income of that enter-
prise also conflicts with the position of the Supreme Court on loss carry-
overs following mergers and with the position the Service has taken on F 
reorganizations. In Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler29 sixteen sales cor-
porations were merged into a single management corporation. This 
surviving corporation then conducted the entire business as a single ·en-
terprise. The amalgamated corporation sought to carry forward pre-
merger losses incurred by the sales corporations to offset post-merger 
income. The Supreme Court in construing the predecessor30 to section 
172 accepted the Government's alternative contention that the carry-
over privilege was not available unless there was "continuity of business 
enterprise." In other words, it held that pre-merger losses could offset 
current income only to the extent that the latter was derived from 
substantially the same business which produced the loss. Ignoring the 
fact the pre-merger business constituted an integrated enterprise, the 
227 Whitman, supra note 1, at 1223. 
228See Andrew M.Spheeris, 54 T.C.1353, 1363 (1970). 
229 353 u.s. 382 (1957). 
230 INT. REv. ConE of 1939, § 122 (b)(2)(c). That provision provided in pertinent 
part as follows: "If for any taxable year ••. , the taxpayer has a net operating loss, 
such net operating loss shall he a net operating loss carry-over for each of three suc-
ceeding taxable years •••• " (Emphasis added). The meaning of the term taxpayer, 
which does not exist in the 1954 Code's counterpart to this provision, was the focal point 
of the Court's inquiry. 
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Court found that the pre-merger enterprise was composed of "several 
businesses." A corrollary of this holding is that in a multi-corporate 
integrated enterprise the income reported by the sales corporations is 
not all attributable to or earned by the management corporation. An 
opposite conclusion would require that the surviving management cor-
poration be the same taxpayer that incurred the loss thereby contradict-
ing the Libson holding. 
Libson Shops also casts doubt on a recent trend in reorganizations of 
a single integrated business enterpFise that, although conceptually con-
sistent with Marc's Big Boy, is opposed by the Service. In Home Con-
_struction Corp. v. United States,231 the Fifth Circuit accepted the tax-
payer's contention that the consolidaci<;>n of more than one corporate 
entity can satisfy the mere change in identity or form definicion of an 
F reorganizacion.232 An F reorganization is the only type of reorganiza-
tion in which post-merger losses can be carried back and applied against 
the income of a corporation disappearing in the merger.233 Contrary 
to the major premise of Libson Shops the Fifth Circuit found that 
the amalgamated corporation was the alter ego of the pre-merger cor-
porations that had conducted a single integrated business. The couri: 
rested its conclusion upon findings of [1] an identity of shareholder and 
proprietary interest; [2] unimpaired continuity of the essential business 
enterprise, and [3] no substantive difference between taxpayer's pre:.. 
merger operation consisting of multiple corporations and its post-merger 
operation consisting of numerous divisions of a single corporacion.234 
These are some of the same factors upon which the Tax Court rested 
its decision in Marc's Big Boy. Indeed, the development in these two 
areas is one of parallel evolution. Nevertheless, the Service, in a curious 
reversal of position235 resists stren~ously the application of F reorganiza-
. 231439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1971) (merger of 123 corporations). 
232 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (F). 
233Jd. § 381(b)(3). The F reorganization overrides other reorganization provisions. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.38l(b)-l(a)(2); Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 126. 
234 The lower court stated the issue as follows: 
Does a reorganization involving a statutory merger of functionally related corpora-
ti071S which comprise integral parts of- a unified and centrally managed and c~ 
trolled O'Ver-all business enterprise into a single corporation with no change in 
stockholders or their proprietary interests, no change in the ownership, form or 
location of the corporate assets, no change in the corporate personnel or manag!1-
ment, and no change in the type, scope and method of business operations, con-
stitute a 'mere change in identity, form_ or place of organization'? 
. (Emphasis added). 311 F. Supp. 830, 835 (S.D. Ala. 1969). See generally Frank, F Re-
Mganization_:_A New Life Under the Tax Reform Act?, 49 Taxes 169 (1971). 
235 Ironically, the application of § 368(a) (1) (F) was first urged by the Comrni5sioner 
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tion status to mergers involving a single, integrated business conducted 
in multi-corporate form. 
Constructive Dividends 
The generation of income doctrine, as applied in Mate's Big Boy, also 
conflicts with the Service's posture in the area of constructive dividends. 
Arguing that a shareholder is entitled to an adequate return on his equity, 
the Service asserts that when a corporation pays no dividends to a share-
holder-employee, a portion of the employee's compensation is a divi-
dend, the payment of which is not a deduction.236 The effect of the de-
cision in Marc's Big Boy is to refute this position: for the court denied 
the subsidiaries any return on their capital invested in facilities or em-
ployees. 
Moreover, the joint application of the concept of a constructive divi-
dend and the doctrine of generation of income produces a paradoxical 
result. If a sales corporation in a closely integrated business enterprise 
earns no taxable income, it has no current earnings and profits. There-
fore, assuming no accumulated 'earnings and profits, if one of the restau-
rant subsidiaries in Marc's Big Boy were spun-off to a shareholder-em-
ployee, that portion of his compensation treated as a constructive 
dividend would be a dividend distributed out of capital, since there 
would be no current earnings under the generation of income doctrine. 
Thus, assuming no accumulated earnings and profits, the constructive 
dividend could be tax-free up to an amount equal to the shareholder-
employee's basis in his stock and taxed at capital gains rates thereafter.237 
in the context of the liquidation-reincorporation problem. The shareholders of the 
old corporation liquidate it under section 331, withdrawing accumulated earnings in 
the form of cash at capital gains rate (INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 331, 1001, and 1221) 
and obtaining a stepped-up fair market value basis for the other assets under section 
334(a), which they then transfer with a carry-over basis to a new corporation owned 
in substantially the same proportions (ld. §§ 351, 362(a) (1)). One of the Service's 
counter attacks is that the entire transaction constitutes an F reorganization with the 
cash being distributed as a boot-dividend under section 356{a) {2), or preferably as a 
functionally unrelated dividend under section 301. See Pugh, The F Reorganization: 
Reveille For A Sleeping Giant?, 24 TAX L. REv. 437, 443-45 (1969) (hereinafter cited 
as Pugh). 
236 See Horsley & Dray, supra note 121, at 147 . 
.237 A distribution of money, securities or other property (except stock in the corpora-
tion malcing the distribution, subject to certain further exceptions in section 305) by a 
corporation with respect to its stock is included in gross income to the extent that it. 
is a dividend. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 301(a), 301(c), and 317(a). A dividend 
is a § 301 distribution made out of [1] accumulated earnings and profits or [2] out of 
earnings and profits of the taxable year. Id. § 316. The portion of such distribution 
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As a further twist, accumulated earnings might also prove no barrier to 
preferential treatment. Due to the absence of a statute of limitations on 
recomputation of earnings and profits, such a shareholder, unless barred 
by the doctrine of quasi-estoppel,238 could argue that his corporation had 
~o accumulated earnings and profits arising in closed years under the 
Big Boy rationale.239 
CoNcLusiON AND PROPOSAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
The Tax Court's position that in an integrated business enterprise a 
management corporation, completely controlling the other entities, gen-
erates and is taxable upon the entire income of the enterprise is in con-
flict with many areas of tax law. This conflict compels the Service 
to abandon the Marc's Big Boy approach in favor of a standard of allo-
cation under section 482 that considers the substantive business activities 
of all the functionally separated corporations in an integrated enterprise. 
Such a standard would not deny absolutely the benefit of multiple sur-
tax exemptions to affiliated corporations carrying on substantive busi-
ness activities in the framework of an integrated enterprise, but would 
only undo artificial shifting of income undertaken to acquire the tax 
advantage of such exemptions. 
For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1974, and during the 
latter part of the phase-out period for multiple surtax exemptions, the 
principal potentiality for abuse will lie in avoiding the definition of 
"controlled group of corporations." If multiple corporations are able 
to operate as "one economic entity," and at the same time avoid this 
definition, an appropriate legislative response would be to define statu-
torily a controlled group to include every venture that constitutes a 
single integrated business enterprise. However, during the phase-out 
period th'ere is a strong policy argument that no new administrative or 
judicial approach should be constructed to deny the remaining, but 
steadily decreasing benefits of multiple surtax exemptions. One could 
which is not a dividend reduces the adjusted basis of the stock, Id. § 30l(c) (2), and any 
excess is treated as capital gain, Id. § 301 (c)(3)(A). 
238 Lee, Shareholder Withdrawal-Loan or Dividend: Repayments, Estoppel, and 
Other Anomalies, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 512, 553-60 (1971). 
239 Although section 482 is probably a one-way street with only the Commissioner 
having the power to invoke it, Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(b) (3) (1962); Eustice, supra note 
67, at 484; see generally Sherman, supra note 157, at 29-32; but see Cooper, Section 45, 
4 TAx L. REv. 131 (1948), it would appear that the ta,.,:payer is entitled to invoke section 
61 (a), and thus achieve much the same result as a section 42 realloca~on of entire net 
income. 
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:argue that Congress, aware of the overall economic impact of an im-
m'ediate elimination of multiple surtax exemptions chose a gradual ap-
proach.240 If, however, the Service is willing to second-gu·ess Congress, 
it should attack the multiple surtax exemption through section 269, 
focusing on the business purposes for multiple incorporation of an in-
tegrated business. 
Section 269 is designed to disallow a tax benefit that would distort the 
liability of a particular taxpayer. The regulations provide that such 
distortion may be manifested when the essential nature of the taxpayer's 
situation is examined in the light of the basic purpose Congress intended 
to effectuate through the benefit.241 The surtax exemption was in-
tended as a concession for small business. Use of multiple surtax 'exemp-
tions by a single integrated business is inconsistent with this limited 
purpose. Nevertheless neither the surtax provisions nor section 269 
bar tlie use of the exemption by large corporations. Therefore, the 
crucial question under section 269 must be the purpose of the transac-
tion. 
The regulations under section 269 state that tax avoidance is the 
purpose of a transaction in which two or more corporations are formed 
instead of a single corporation merely to secure the benefit of multiple 
surtax exemptions.242 On the other hand, the legislative history of sec-
tion 1551 and the multiple corporation provisions contained in the Reve-
nue Act of 1964 indicate that formation of additional corporations is 
a legitimate business purpose if done to expand an existing integrated 
business, to engage in different businesses in the same geographic area, 
or to engage in the same business in different geographic locales. These 
two conflcting policies must be resolved if the objective is immediate 
elimination of multiple surtax exemptions in multi-corporate integrated 
enterprises. 
The principal purpose test under section 269 does not require the ab-
sence of any business purpose for the transaction at issue, it merely 
requires that the tax avoidance purpose exceed in importance any other 
purpose.243 Thus the Service could adopt the position that in an inte-
240 Of interest in this context is H.R. 6640, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (an identical 
·bill H.R. 19858, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) failed to emerge from Committee in the 
previous session), which would under cenain circumstances suspend in effect the ap-
plication of section 269 and 1551 to multiple corporations during the phase-out period. 
See note 245 infra, aud accompanying text. 
241 Treas. Reg.§ 1.269-2(b) (1962). 
242 Treas. Reg.§ 1.269-3 (b) (2) (1962). 
243 Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3 (a) (2) (1962). 
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grated enterprise the purpose of securing multiple surtax exemptions .. 
will generally outweigh the busin'ess purposes of expansion into differ-
ent geographic areas or different businesses. Although the legislative·· 
history cited above indicates the Congress felt that the converse was-
true, Congress' interpretation of existing law, as contrasted with con-
temporaneous committee prints accompanying a new enactment, is nor-
binding on a court.244 Furthermore, had Congress desired to sanctify 
expansion of an integrated enterprise, it could have done so expressly_ 
A bill proposed in the 91st Congress and reintroduced in the 92d Con-
gress245 would have precluded the application of sections 269 and 1551 
to disallow the surtax exemption to any corporation organized prior to· 
January 1, 1970, "as part of a program of business expansion to engage-
in business in a separate marketing location not previously served" by 
the affiliated group, unl'ess the corporation was formed in the split-up-
of an existing business. In any event, asserting that obtaining multiple 
surtax exemptions meets the principal purpose test of section 269 is: 
preferable to a distortion of section 482 through reallocating the entire· 
taxable income of a corporation that is not a sham. 
In abandoning its position that the management entity in an inte-
grated business enterprise earns and is taxable on the entire income of 
the enterprise Treasury should create specific safe havens in the "per-
formance of services for another" portion of the amended regulations.24G-
The current regulations value management services at an arm's length 
charge de'emed equal to the performer's cost without a profit mark-up· 
except where the services are an integral part of the business activity of 
either the performer or th'e recipient.247 The exception includes the 
following circumstances: 248 [1] where the performer or recipient is: 
engaged in the business of rendering management services to unrelated· 
parties; [2] where rendering management services to related parties: 
is one of tire principal activities of the performer;249 [3] where the per-
'244 Golsen v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 985, 990 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -
(1971). Cf. Sicanoff Vegetable Oil Corp., 27 T.C. 1056, 1073 (1957), rwd rm other. 
grounds, 251 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1958). 
245H.R. 19859, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 6640, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
· 246Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (1968), mne11ded by T.D. 6964, 7-24-68 and T.D. 6998. 
(1-17-69) . 
. 2.47Treas. Reg.§ 1.482-2(b) (3). 
248 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (b) (7). 
249 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (b) (7) (ii) (a). There is a safe cove: an exception to the 
exception if the cost of services does not exceed 25% of the total annual expenses of the 
performer. 
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former is peculiarly capable of rendering the services and they consti-
tute a principal element in the -operations of the recipient; and [ 4] where 
the recipient has received the berrefit of a substantial amount of manage-
ment services from one or more related parties in the taxable year.2110 
In the typical integrated enterprise the management services would fall 
into at least one of these exceptions,251 in which case the only standard 
contained in the regulations for determining the arm's length charge 
is the amount which would have been charged for similar services in 
independent transactions with unrelated party under similar circum-
:stances considering all relevant facts.252 
The proposed regulations that preceded the current regulations con-
-rained a much narrower exception to the generally applicable arm's 
length charge of cost.253 Value, rather than cost, was the applicabl'e 
-charge only where the services were a part of the trade or business of 
the performing corporation.. Thus the proposed regulations implicitly 
required that a significant amount of services be rendered to unrelated 
parties.2114 The simplest route to C'ertainty would be a return to the 
proposed regulation's approach, substituting for the integral part of 
trade or business exception an exception when th·e trade or business of 
-rhe management corporation is rendering services to unrelated parties. 
However, under this approach the performer of managem'ent services 
in an integrated enterprise would not be taxable on any part of the 
net income of the entire enterprise-a result as difficult to justify as 
the Big Boy conclusion that it is taxable on the entire profit. In short, 
the present exceptions to the cost rule are more responsive to the 
underlying policies of section 482 than the trade or business exception 
of the proposed regulations. 255 It is the absence of a safe haven for de:.. 
termining value of the services that needs to be supplied. 
One approach for determining such value would be the "cost plus 
250 Again there is a minor safe haven if the total cost to the performers of the services 
rendered do not exceed 25% of the expenses of the recipient.. Treas. Reg .. § 1..482-2 
(b) (7) (iv) (1968). 
-, 251 One commentator has pointed out that the second exception in text appears to be 
directed, in part, at management corporations formed to render administrative services 
-to a group of controlled corporations .. Jenks, supra note 88, at 298 .. 
252[d .. at 299 (regulations "afford no clue" as to how a profit markup, where required, 
is to be determined) .. 
253 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (7), 31 Fed .. Reg. 10,394 (1966); see generally 
Eustice, supra note 67, at 505. 
, :254Eusti~e, supra note 67, at 505 .. 
· :255 Eustice, Affiliated Corporations Revisited, Recent Developments Under Sectiom 
482 tmd 367, 24 TAX L. REv. 101, 107 (1968). 
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method;" Under this approach, which is one of the alternative methods 
adopted by the regulations in the area of sales of tangible property,256 
the value of management services would be the sum of their cost to 
the p·erformer plus an appropriate specific gross profit percentage. The 
principal difficulty with this approach is that it requires the regulations to 
set forth a specific gross profit percentage in order to provide a safe 
haven. The administrative position in the past has been that the varia-
tion in profit margins both industry to industry, among companies. 
within an industry, and 'even among product lines within a single com-
pany is too great to permit a single percentage, or series of percentages, 
as profit mark-ups.257 
The solution lies in a fair division of profits approach.258 One tech-
nique would be to allocate an amount equal to five percent of gross 
-sales or fifty perc·ent of net income, whichever is greater, to the sales 
corporation and to allocate the remainder to the management entity. An 
actual implementation of this approach may be seen in the House's. 
proposed Domestic International Sales Corporation or "DISC" provi-
sions.259 The profits of a DISC, a domestic corporation engaged almost 
exclusively in the export business, would not be taxed to it, but only 
to its shareholders when repatriated to them. To avoid the complexities 
of pricing under section 482 in the case of sales by an affiliated domestic 
corporation to a related DISC,260 two pricing rules are provided to 
determine the permissible deferred profits in the DISC-even if the sale 
is not the equivalent of an arm's length bargain. A DISC may 'earn a 
portion of the combined profit on the export sales equal to four per-
cent of its disqualified export gross receipts (plus ten percent of its 
export promotion exp·enses attributable to the sale, which is intended 
to encourage the transfer of foreign sales functions and activities to the 
DISC),261 or fifty percent of the combined taxable income of the DISC 
and the related party arising from the sal·e (plus ten percent of the 
attributable export promotion expenses) whichever is greater. 
A fixed percentage of gross sales or of net income suffers, however, 
from the same failing as a fixed profit mark-up: this percentage may 
not reflect the contribution each component of an integtated busin·ess 
256Treas, Reg.§ 1.482-2(e) (4) (1968). 
257 Surrey, supra note 11, at 76; see generally Jenks, supra note 88, at 311. 
258 See generally Jenks, The "Creation of Income" Doctrine: A Comment on the 
Proposed Section 482 Regulations, 43 TAXES 486, 493 (1965). 
259 H.R. 10947, § 501, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
260 H.R. Rep. No. 92-533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1971); accord, S. Rep. No. 92-437,. 
91st Cong., 1st Sess.107 (1971). 
261 I d. at 75, 108. 
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makes to the entire profit of the enterprise. A method which comes 
closer to accomplishing that goal would be an optional allocation form-
ula based on the ratio of asS'ets, compensation of employees, business 
expenses, etc., attributable to each component and attributable to the 
entire enterprise. This approach (which is similar to the 1962 House 
proposal to modify section 482 with respect to sales of tangible goods 
between domestic and foreign controlled taxpayers) looks to the entire 
business arrangement between the affiliated corporations as did the 
Big Boy court. But it avoids many of the problems of that decision. 
Such an allocation formula approach expressly recognizes that where a 
controlled corporation owns assets used in its business and pays ·em-
ployees who perform services for that business, it earns some portion of 
the enterprise's income. This fundamental principle was ignored in 
Marc's Big Boy. This approach, of course, would satisfy any require-
ment that the amendatory regulations be used where applicable. It would 
also meet the Second Circuit's concern that an allocation be flexible 
and responsive to the principle that separate ta:\.'Payers be recog-
nized for tax purposes in all but extreme instances. The approach 
focuses on the income producing activities and assets of each compon-
ent, including management, rather than merely on the management 
control, and thereby avoids the erroneous generation of income doctrine. 
Though a formula division of profits does not specifically consider each 
intercompany transaction but rather the entire structure of the inte-
grated enterprise, a reasonable division of income in the ultimate analysis 
should reach the same monetary result as the aggregate application of 
the arm's length standard to each transaction. Certainly a reasonable 
division of profits has be·en used as a proof to determine whether the 
arm's length equivalency had been satisfied.262 
Creation of safe havens based on a formula allocation of net income 
under the performance of services portion of the regulations would 
provide certainty primarily to integrated S'ervice industries where the 
controlled taxpayers selling at retail do not sell property produced by 
an affiliate. In other circumstances a fair division of net income would 
apply to management services; but an arm's length approach now pro-
vided in the amendatory regulations would apply to sales of tangible 
property. To avoid the problems of determination of the portions of 
the entire enterprise's income to which each standard would be ap-
plied, and of coordination of the results of such application, formula 
262 See PPG Indus., Inc., 55 T.C. 928, 997 (1970); Lufkin Foundry & Mach. Co., 40 
P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 422,460 (1971). 
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:allocation could be limited to situations where the only intercompany 
transactions consist of rendering management services. The opposite 
extreme would be to abandon the search for the elusive arm's length 
charge contained in the present amended regulations and apply a 
formula allocation of profits standard to all intercompany transactions. 
An across-the-board application of a formula allocation app·ears, how-
ever, best suited to a single, integrated business enterprise because all 
components of the enterprise contribute to its income. Accordingly, 
this formula allocation· approach should not only apply to intercompany 
transactions of an integrated enterprise, but should apply to all such 
transactions. 
The proposed approach could coexist with the DISC proposals by 
expanding the latter's referenC'e to arm's length charge (deferral of the 
greater of 50 percent of net profits, or arm's length charge) to include a 
formula allocation of net profits in an integrated business. This would 
lead to three standards for division of profits: [ 1] the DISC 50 percent of 
net profits, [ 2] 10 percent of gross sales, and [ 3] a formula allocation. 
But th'e alternative of an allocation formula is no more objectionable than 
an arm's length charge alternative. A serious criticism might, however 
be raised that availability of a safe haven formula allocation to an inte-
grated international 'enterprise would permit the use of foreign export 
subsidiaries operating in tax haven jurisdictions as tax deferral alterna-
tives to DISC's, yet subject to none of the latter's restrictions. Solving 
this problem of incorporating DISC restrictions into any allocation 
formula provisions appears more a legislative than an administrative task. 
Any allocation formula that is based upon compensation and other 
deductions attributable to each controlled taxpayer must also provide 
rules for determining to which taxpayer such deductions are attribut-
able. For example, under the present regulations the reallocation to 
foreign subsidiaries of a portion of the executive salaries paid by the 
parent corporation has become a prime source of controversy.263 Under 
an allocation formula the incentive would b'e for the Service to reallo-
cate deductions to the domestic parent since the taxable income would 
follow correspondingly. Under the present regulations this question 
263 Jenks, supra note 88, at 297. Similarly, for the purposes of the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (INT. REv. ConE of 1954, §§ 3101-26), the Service maintains that a 
portion of the salaries of executives of a parent corporation is deemed to be paid by 
subsidiaries, if such executives are officers of both the parent and subsidiaries, and per-
form substantial services for both in such capacity. Rev. Rul. 69-316, 1969-1 CuM. Buu. 
263. In an integrated multi-corporate enterprise, this position conflicts with the Marc's 
Big Boy rationale. 
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of allocation of managelll'ent services is the subject of the "intended 
benefits" test. Services undertaken for the joint benefit of members of 
a controlled group, but primarily intended to benefit one member, are 
to be allocated according to the relative benefit intended, unless the 
probable ben'efits to the other members were so indirect or remote that 
unrelated parties would not have been charged for such services or the 
service is a mere duplication of services which the related party has in-
dependently performed or is performing for itsel£.264 On the other 
hand, the court decisions draw an additional distinction betWeen "super-
visory controls" for the parent and "specific management'' services for 
the subsidiaries.265 This distinction has been read as a primary benefit 
test-whether the primary benefit is to protect or advance the overall 
business of the parent, thereby precluding an allocation.266 Utilization 
of an allocation formula and a functional test would obviate some of 
the difficulties in the present benefit test in determining to which tax-
payer a deduction is attributable. Management services, whether su-
pervisory controls or specific management controls, would be attributed 
to the service corporation. Difficulties would no doubt arise in enter-
prises that were not cleanly divided along functional lines. In any 
event this area would have to be carefully explored if a formula allo-
cation approach were adopted. 267 
In summary, the absence of support for, and the inconsistencies re-
sulting from, the generation of income doctrine as applied in Marc's 
Big Boy dictate that the Servie'e abandon this approach in making allo-
cations under section 482. As an immediate solution to intercorporate 
abuse the Commissioner should limit his attack to section 269 and th'e 
specific intercompany transactional regulations under section 482. As 
an ultimate solution to the problem of allocation among the entities 
of an integrated business enterprise, a formula method of allocation 
based upon the ratio of assets, compensation of employees, and business 
expenses attributable to each component of the •enterprise should be 
adopted. 
264Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (2) (1968). See generally Jenks, supra note 48, at 296-97. 
265 Young & Rubicam, Inc. v. United States, 410 F. 2d 1223 (Ct. CL 1969); see 
Columbian Rope Co., 42 T.C. 800, 814 (1964). 
266 Kalish & Bodner, supra note 111, at 7. It has been suggested that the "benefit 
test'' of the regulations should be modified to include this prior development. See 
Miller, Proposals for Amelioration of Section 482 Allocations Affecting U.S. Taxpayers 
with Foreign Affiliations, 44 TAXES 209, 270-73 (1966). 
2~7 One approach would be to allocate costs which are not easily attributable to a 
specific member of the controlled group in the same proportion as readily attributable 
deductions are allocated. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.613-3(d) (1) (iii) (1968). 
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' THE DisPoSITION OF Marc's Big Boy oN APPEAL: AN ADDENDUM 
The Seventh Circuit has recently affirmed Marc's Big Boy.268 On 
tpe surface the importance of its opinion is limited to the incidene'e of 
burden of proof with the added fillip that reconstructing the course of 
dealings among a highly integrated group of taxpayers to comply with 
the arm's length standard is probably neither realistic nor feasible. How-
ever, a close reading reveals that the generation of income doctrine is 
still a factor. 
On appeal the taxpayers argued that since each separately incorpo-
rated restaurant operation must have contributed in some degree to the 
overall net income of the integrated enterprise and, therefore, generated 
some of the n·et income, a total allocation was unreasonable, arbitrary, 
and capricious. Accordingly, they argued the Commissioner had failed 
t9 prove in the Tax Court any less extrenre allocation, and no allocation 
should be allowed. The Commissioner countered with the argument 
that the Tax Court decision was correct since "faced with clear evidenc·e 
that some allocation was necessary, taxpayers refrained from introducing 
any real proof supporting a lesser allocation." 269 
The circuit court, as the Tax Court before it, chose to limit itself to 
the extreme positions staked out by the parties. It held that the issue on 
appeal boiled down to the incidence of burden of proof and that the Tax 
Court had fairly placed that burden on the taxpayers. The appellate court 
agreed with the Tax Court below that the taxpayers had failed to show 
that the Commissioner's allocation was arbitrary based on the following 
factors: [ 1] the segments of the highly integrated group were so in-
terdependent that any attempt at reconstruction of their course of deal-
ings to approximate the arm's length standard would be fanciful and 
unreal, [2] as the Tax Court saw it,210 the management entity generated 
the entire income, and [3] the taxpayers failed to demonstrate a more 
favorable allocation consistent with the arm's length standard. 
Thus, the appellate court seemingly held that to establish the arbi-
trariness of a section 482 allocation the taxpayer must show a more 
favorable allocation. And the Commissioner is sure to read this as re-
268 Nos. 18470-71 (7th Cir., Nov. 23, 1971). 
269 Id. at 5. 
670 The circuit court did not directly hold that the parent generated the entire income 
of the enterprise. Rather it pointed out that the Tax Court had so held and in another 
portion of its opinion stated that the Tax Court's findings of fact were not clearly 
erroneous. Under the clearly erroneous principle, an appellate courr will upset a trial 
court's decision only if there was no evidence to support that decision. Commissioner v. 
Duberstein, 363 U.S.278 (1960). 
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quiring a showing of the correct allocation. Yet, heretofore, it had been 
thought, under the aegis of Helvering v. Taylor,211 that a taxpayer pro-
ceeding in the Tax Court was required merely to prove that the Com-
missioner's allocation was arbitrary (for example, that the taxpayer 
earned some part of the income which it had reported but which had 
been allocated to a related entity272) ; he need not establish the correct 
amount of the tax as is required in a refund case.273 That would be 
establislred upon the remanding and reopening of the case for additional 
evidence to determine a partial allocation. 
Although neither party argued for this middle ground, the Seventh 
Circuit did discuss the solution of remanding for a determination of a 
partial allocation as it had done in a recent decision.274 It did not elect 
that solution in Marc's Big Boy because in its view [1] an arm's length 
standard reconstruction was probably neither realistic nor feasible, [2] 
the taxpayers did not attempt to make such a reconstruction or to es-
tablish its feasibility, and [3] "the findings of tire trier of facts were 
adverse to the taxpayers, and not clearly erroneous." 275 The last factor 
may well be the keystone of the appellate decision. For it follows from 
this conclusion that the Tax Court's .finding that the management entity 
generated the entire income of the integrated enterprise was not dis-
turbed. Consequently, the essential premise of the taxpayers' case, that 
each restaurant corporation earned some part of this entire income, was 
implicitly rejected by the Seventh Circuit. Thus, the burden of proof 
discussion was not necessarily directed to the situation in which the tax-
payer can prove that the very basis of the Commissioner's allocation was 
arbitrary, but can not establish the correct distribution of income and 
deductions. The Seventh Circuit's disposition may accordingly be 
viewed in this context as merely repeating the error of the Tax Court 
in not recognizing that the restaurant subsidiaries did generate some 
portion of the income that they reported. If, however, it requires more 
than a taxpayer's showing that the entity reporting income earned some 
211293 u.s. 507 (1935). 
272 W. Braun Co. v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968). 
273 See Plumb & Kapp, supra note 85, at 830. Although the Commissioner argued on 
brief that Helvering v. Taylor did not involve section 482 and its special rule of proof, 
Brief for Commissioner, pp. 41-2 (7th Cir. 1971). in fact, it had been applied (as had 
the Cohan rule, of which Taylor may be viewed as the appellate cousin) in section 482 
cases, e.g., Campbell County State Bank v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 
1963). 
274 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United States, 435 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1970). 
27G Nos. 18470-71 at 6 (7th Cir., Nov. 23, 1971). 
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portion thereof to establish the arbitrariness of the Commissioner's re-
allocation of the taxpayer's entire income, the app'ellate decision is in 
conflict with prior precedent and is erroneous. 
The conclusion of the Seventh Circuit that any attempt to reconstruct 
the Big Boy course of dealings to approximate the arm's length standard 
would not b'e feasible is probably correct, at least to the extent the court 
was limiting its conclusion to a reconstruction by merely adjusting the 
fee structure.276 This conclusion highlights the immediate necessity for 
implementation of a fair division of profits approach where highly in-
tegrated groups of taxpayers are involved. If such an approach is not 
administratively adopted, it is to be hoped that the courts will fashion 
an approach along the lines suggested in this article. Otherwise, tax 
controversies are certain to arise where the Government, in reliance 
upon broad readings of the two Big Boy opinions, will launch a three-
pronged attack: [ 1] the management entity in a highly integrated 
group of related taxpayers earns the entire income of the group, [2] 
the burden is on the taxpayer to establish a more favorable (correct) 
allocation consistent with th'e arm's length standard, and [3] any such 
reconstruction attempted by the hapless taxpayer is fanciful and unreal. 
In short the Big Boy development illustrates the sterility of applica-
tion of the legal abstraction of the arm's length standard, particularly in 
the caS'e of an integrated group, and mandates a reexamination of the 
concept of division of net income among related parties.277 
27G The court's first reference to the difficulty of reconstructing the integrated group's 
dealings to conform with the arm's length standard was expressly limited to recon-
structions through mere adjustments to the fee structure. Its reasoning would prob-
ably also apply to reconstructions through adjustments to other specific intercompany 
transaction pricing arrangements. 
277 See Jenks, supra note 88, at 312-13. 
